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Formal economic analysis of trade agreements typically treats disputes as synonymous with concerns
about enforcement. But in reality, most WTO disputes involve disagreements of interpretation concerning
the agreement, or instances where the agreement is simply silent. And some have suggested that the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) might serve a useful purpose by granting "exceptions" to rigid
contractual obligations in some circumstances. In each of these three cases, the role played by the
DSB amounts to "completing" various dimensions of an incomplete contract. Moreover, there is a
debate among legal scholars on whether or not precedent-setting in DSB rulings may enhance the performance
of the institution. All of this points to the importance of understanding the implications of the different
possible degrees of activism in the role played by the DSB. In this paper we bring formal analysis
to bear on this broad question. We characterize the choice of contractual form and DSB role that is
optimal for governments under various contracting conditions. A novel feature of our approach is that
it highlights the interaction between the design of the contract and the design of the dispute settlement
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When countries sign on to an international agreement, what kinds of disputes are anticipated,
and what mechanisms are put in place to deal with these disputes? In the context of trade
agreements, formal economic analysis typically treats disputes as synonymous with concerns
about enforcement, and thereby provides answers to this question from the perspective of
optimal enforcement.1
Yet even a cursory familiarity with the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) suggests that the answer to this question is likely to be far more com-
plex and subtle than a focus on enforcement alone might suggest. In a typical WTO case, the
issue under dispute is rarely the straightforward enforcement of an unambiguous obligation
under the agreement. Rather, as a legal matter, most WTO disputes seem to involve plausi-
ble disagreements of interpretation concerning what the disputing parties actually signed on
to, or instances where the legal text of the agreement is simply silent. Consider, for example,
the WTO Appellate Body Decision United States - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh,
Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia (WTO, 2001). In this case,
the following issues were central to the resolution of the dispute (see Horn and Mavroidis,
2003): the meaning of ￿unforeseen developments,￿the de￿nition of ￿serious injury,￿the ac-
ceptable method for establishing ￿causality,￿the meaning of ￿increased imports,￿and the
meaning of ￿threat.￿
Of course, the e⁄ective enforcement of an international trade agreement must be a critical
determinant of its value to member governments; but at least in the WTO, actual disputes
(as opposed to o⁄-equilibrium threats) seem to be more about interpreting ￿vague￿aspects of
the contract and ￿lling ￿gaps￿in the contract than about enforcing unambiguous obligations
speci￿ed by the contract.2 And it has been suggested by some legal scholars that the WTO
DSB might serve a useful purpose by granting ￿exceptions￿to rigid contractual obligations
in some circumstances and thereby modifying the contract.3 In each of these three cases, the
activist role played by the DSB amounts to ￿completing￿various dimensions of an incomplete
contract.
In this paper, we bring formal economic analysis to bear on these broader aspects of the
question posed above. In particular, we evaluate the possible role that a DSB might play
in helping to complete an incomplete contract, and we characterize the choice of contrac-
1See, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (2002, Chapter 6) and the literature cited therein.
2Actual WTO disputes may also be about adjusting the bargain in order to maintain enforceability of the
contract in the presence of exogenous shocks (see, for example, Bagwell and Staiger, 1990) or to facilitate
a form of ￿e¢ cient breach￿(see, for example, Sykes, 2000, Schwartz and Sykes, 2002, Lawrence, 2003, and
Howse and Staiger, 2005).
3See, for example, the discussion in WTO (2007, pp. 279-282).
2tual incompleteness and DSB design that would be optimal for governments under various
contracting conditions. A distinctive and novel feature of our approach is that it highlights
the interaction between the design of the contract and the design of the dispute settlement
procedure, and it views these as two components of a single over-arching institutional design
problem.
We build from a setting of costly contracting along the lines of Battigalli and Maggi
(2002) and Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2006) which gives rise to two forms of contractual
incompleteness: rigidity and discretion. From this starting point, we use a simple form of
fuzzy logic to introduce a contracting language which is vague in nature, and which gives
rise to a third form of contractual incompleteness: vagueness. Our analysis then naturally
pairs the three possible (non-enforcement) roles of the DSB described above with our three
forms of contract incompleteness: the DSB can interpret aspects of the contract that are left
vague; the DSB can ￿ll gaps where the contract is silent and therefore leaves governments
with discretion; and the DSB can grant exceptions and thereby modify aspects of the contract
that are rigid. Or, the DSB can serve none of these functions and simply enforce contractual
obligations that are unambiguous.
We consider a simple static (one-period) setting where, in a given industry, the importing
country selects a trade policy, and the exporting country can then ￿le a complaint, in which
case the DSB steps in and issues a ruling. An important feature of our model is that
it is costly for both the complainant (exporter government) and the defendant (importer
government) to engage in a dispute, and this gives rise to non-trivial strategic interaction
between them. Indeed, the relative performance of the various institutional arrangements
depends crucially on the impacts of these arrangements on the equilibrium behavior of the
governments, which in turn determines the circumstances under which a trade dispute will
arise in equilibrium: as we later demonstrate, some of the more subtle insights generated by
our framework hinge on how the institutional arrangement a⁄ects the equilibrium occurrence
of disputes.
A critical feature of our contracting environment is the accuracy of DSB rulings in rep-
resenting government preferences. We ￿nd that, if the DSB plays an activist role, the
equilibrium policy tends to be e¢ cient when the DSB is not invoked in equilibrium. And
we show that equilibrium disputes are more frequent when the DSB is less accurate. Thus,
in e⁄ect the motives that trigger a DSB ￿ling are ine¢ cient, and it is the o⁄-equilibrium
impacts of the DSB that are e¢ ciency-enhancing.
We characterize the optimal combination of contract and DSB role, as a function of the
degree of DSB accuracy. We show that when DSB rulings are su¢ ciently accurate, it is
optimal for governments to build discretion into the contract and provide the DSB with
3a mandate to ￿ll the gaps when disputes arise. On the other hand, if DSB rulings are
su¢ ciently inaccurate, we show that it is optimal for governments to negotiate a contract
which is either vague or rigid and to then bar the DSB from engaging in any attempts to
￿complete￿the contract when disputes arise. Finally, if the accuracy of DSB rulings falls
in an intermediate range, we show that it is optimal for governments to negotiate a vague
contract and provide the DSB with a mandate to interpret the vague aspects of the contract
when disputes arise. Notably, if DSB rulings are su¢ ciently accurate and the DSB is given an
activist role, we show that the ￿rst best outcome can be achieved even though the contract
is highly incomplete, the use of the DSB is costly and the DSB rulings are imperfect. The
reason is that the threat of invoking the DSB and the expectation of a su¢ ciently precise
DSB ruling is su¢ cient to induce governments to act e¢ ciently.
Our model can also shed light on the issue of ￿bias￿in observed DSB rulings: both under
the GATT and the WTO, complainants have mostly won their cases. What accounts for
this observed pro-trade bias? Our model suggests that a pro-trade bias in DSB rulings arises
when disputes are mostly triggered as a result of the importer ￿rather than the exporter ￿
acting opportunistically and exploiting the incompleteness of the contract; and in our model,
this selection occurs when the costs of dispute fall su¢ ciently on the exporter relative to the
importer (re￿ ecting, perhaps, the allocation of the burden of proof). We can also address
a related question: When DSB rulings exhibit a pro-trade bias, does the equilibrium policy
outcome exhibit a pro-trade bias as well, in the sense that trade protection is under-utilized
relative to the ￿rst best outcome? A natural conjecture would be that the bias in DSB
rulings and in policy outcomes would go hand-in-hand. But, perhaps surprisingly, we ￿nd
that there is an inverse relationship between the two biases: if there is a pro-trade bias in
DSB rulings there tends to be an anti-trade bias in policy outcomes, and vice-versa.
We next extend the static model to a simple dynamic (two-period) setting to explore
a further issue of DSB design: Should DSB rulings set legal precedent for future rulings?
There is a growing discussion in the legal literature as to whether and to what extent the
actual WTO DSB operates on a precedent system.4 Jackson (2006, page 177) argues that
￿there is quite a powerful precedent e⁄ect in the jurisprudence of the WTO, but ... it is
not so powerful as to require panels or the Appellate Body considering new cases to follow
prior cases,￿ and concludes that ￿the ￿ ￿ avor￿of the precedent e⁄ect in the WTO is still
somewhat ￿ uid.￿Given this state of a⁄airs, where the role of precedent in the WTO is very
4In fact, the appropriate role of precedent in the WTO has become an issue in the recent ￿zeroing￿disputes
(see WTO, 2007a). In its recent report on the matter (see WTO, 2008), the Appelate Body sought to clarify
the role of precedent in the WTO with the following statement: ￿Ensuring ￿ security and predictability￿in the
dispute settlement system, as contemplated in Article 3.2 of the DSU, implies that, absent cogent reasons,
an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case.￿
4much an open issue of institutional design, it seems particularly important to consider the
implications of precedent from a formal perspective. We believe our framework is well-suited
for this kind of analysis.5
In our dynamic setting, we show that the equilibrium frequency of trade disputes rises
with the introduction of legal precedent set by DSB rulings, and that this e⁄ect by itself
diminishes the overall performance of the contract/DSB pair. More broadly, our ￿ndings
suggest that the introduction of precedent can enhance the performance of a contract/DSB-
design pairing only if the expected value of the elimination of duplicative ￿ling costs a⁄orded
by precedent outweighs the expected costs associated with the additional ￿ling behavior that
precedent induces. When we examine how the resolution of these opposing e⁄ects vary with
key parameters of the model, we ￿nd that the introduction of precedent is more likely to
enhance the performance of the institution (i) when the accuracy of DSB rulings is su¢ ciently
low, and (ii) when governments care su¢ ciently little about the future.
In addition to the work of Battigalli and Maggi (2002) and Horn, Maggi and Staiger
(2006) discussed above, we are aware of several other papers that relate to various themes in
our paper. In particular, a number of authors have begun to explore the interplay between
the form of written contracts and the nature and degree of ex-post activities performed by
the court. Shavell (2006), for example, emphasizes how the possible methods of contract
interpretation can a⁄ect the writing of contracts, and characterizes the optimal method of
interpretation. Anderlini, Felli and Postlewaite (2006, 2007) similarly analyze the role of
active courts in contracting environments where the ex-ante contracts are incomplete, and
characterize optimal court behavior (see also Fon and Parisi, 2007). At a broad level, these
papers and our paper have a similar focus, but the particular questions addressed and the
formal treatments are quite distinct.6
A paper that is related to a di⁄erent theme of our paper ￿the notion of vagueness in
contracting language ￿is that of Bustos (2007a), who extends Battigalli and Maggi (2002)
to include a choice between precise and vague clauses in the contract. There are a num-
ber of substantial di⁄erences between our paper and Bustos￿ , but among these di⁄erences
5We are not aware of studies that examine the implications of precedent in the context of international
agreements. But there are several papers in the literature that examine the e⁄ects of precedent in the context
of a domestic court system (see for example the classic analysis by Posner, 1973, and the recent paper by
Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2007). These papers focus mostly on the question whether precedent setting makes
it more or less likely that the body of law will become more e¢ cient over time.
6In the literature on trade agreements, another paper that considers the potential role of the DSB for
completing an incomplete contract is Battigalli and Maggi (2003). They consider a setting in which two
countries choose product standards, and can only write an agreement that covers existing products, not
products that may emerge in the future. To remedy this contractual incompleteness problem, the countries
can institute a DSB that ￿lls the gaps of the contract ex post. However, the formal structure adopted and
the questions addressed in their paper are very di⁄erent from our paper.
5are two: ￿rst, unlike our paper and those reviewed just above, Bustos is not concerned
with the interplay between the form of written contracts and the nature and degree of ex-
post activities performed by the court, and indeed the court in Bustos￿model plays only a
contract-enforcement role; and second, the way in which Bustos de￿nes vagueness ￿a clause
that demands ￿best e⁄ort￿in performing the action ￿is very di⁄erent from the concept of
vagueness that we introduce below and which we believe permeates the contracting language
used in trade agreements.7
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our basic static model,
characterizes the optimal choice of contractual incompleteness and DSB design in this static
setting, and considers the issue of bias in DSB rulings. Section 3 extends the model and
results to a dynamic setting, and considers the impact of precedent setting in contract/DSB
performance. Section 4 brie￿ y considers several extensions of the basic model. Section 5
concludes.
2 The Basic Static Model
We begin this section by describing the economic environment. We then describe the con-
tracting language, the possible contracts, and our assumptions on contracting costs. With
this description in hand, we present our model of the DSB and discuss the possible DSB-
role/contract pairings, and then turn to an analysis of the equilibrium behavior of govern-
ments and optimal contract/DSB design.
2.1 The economic environment
We consider a very simple partial-equilibrium setup to develop our points. We focus on
a single industry in which an importing government chooses a binary import policy T 2
fFT;Pg (Free Trade or Protection) to maximize the payo⁄!(T;s), where s ￿ (s1;s2;:::;sN)
is a state vector. We assume for simplicity that each state variable represents a binary event,
such as ￿there is/is not an import surge￿or ￿the domestic industry does/does not shut down.￿
We will often refer to the random vector s simply as the ￿state.￿We let p(s) denote the
7This is not to say that the notion of vagueness explored by Bustos (2007a) is irrelevant for trade agree-
ments. On the contrary, it is possible to ￿nd speci￿c examples of the kind of vagueness that Bustos seems
to have in mind in the GATT/WTO, where for example GATT Article XVI on subsidies uses the language
￿seek to avoid￿in describing the obligation of contracting parties, or where for example in GATT Article
XXXVII it is stated that ￿the developed contracting parties shall to the fullest extent possible...￿. These
phrases seem to represent the kind of clause that ￿ts well with Bustos￿conception of vagueness. Our point
here is simply that there is a more pervasive kind of vagueness in the GATT/WTO contracting language,
and our modeling represents an attempt to formalize it.
6probability that state s occurs. The exporting government is assumed to remain passive in
this industry (i.e., there is no exporter policy), and its payo⁄is given by !￿(T;s). We denote
the joint payo⁄ of the two governments by ￿(T;s) ￿ !(T;s) + !￿(T;s). Transfers between
governments are ruled out by assumption.8
Let ￿(s) ￿ !(P;s) ￿ !(FT;s) denote the importing government￿ s gain from protection.
This gain may be thought of as arising from some combination of terms-of-trade and political
considerations. We assume that ￿(s) > 0 for all states s. Similarly, let ￿￿(s) ￿ !￿(P;s) ￿
!￿(FT;s). We assume that ￿￿(s) < 0 for all s: the exporting government always dislikes
import barriers.
Let ￿(s) ￿ ￿(s)+￿￿(s) = ￿(P;s)￿￿(FT;s) denote the joint (positive or negative) gain
from protection for the two governments. We let ￿FT and ￿P denote the sets of states for
which the ￿rst best (joint-surplus-maximizing) policy is respectively FT and P, or equiva-
lently, ￿(s) < 0 for s 2 ￿FT and ￿(s) > 0 for s 2 ￿P.9 To make the problem interesting, we
assume that the ￿rst-best policy is Protection in some states and Free Trade in others; this
amounts to assuming that ￿FT and ￿P are non-empty. We also assume that each of the N
state variables is relevant for determining the ￿rst-best policy (in the particular sense that,
for each of the N state variables, there is at least one state in which the ￿rst-best policy
hinges on the realized value of that state variable).
The governments observe the realized state s and the value of ￿(s). However, ￿ is not
veri￿able, so contracts cannot be made directly contingent on ￿.10 The underlying state
variables (s1;s2;:::;sN) on the other hand are veri￿able, and they can be speci￿ed in a
contract at some cost. Therefore, the ￿rst-best outcome can be implemented by a contract
that makes the policy contingent on the state variables.
8In practice, direct transfers are rarely used as part of international trade agreements, but indirect
transfers may be feasible. For instance, in the process of negotiating a trade agreement, it is not uncommon
for countries to grant market access through tari⁄ concessions in return for concessions from their trading
partners that are unrelated to market access (e.g., tighter intellectual property rights protection, or beefed-
up drug control e⁄orts), and these non-market-access concessions can be interpreted as indirect transfers.
We could allow for such ex-ante transfers in our model (i.e., transfers that occur at the stage of writing
the contract), and need only rule out ex-post transfers (i.e., transfers that occur at the time of a dispute).
The resolution of WTO disputes almost never involve direct transfers (the one exception to date is the US-
Copyright case; see WTO, 2007, pp. 283-286), and indirect transfers of the sort described above are typically
not feasible in the time-frame of dispute resolution. Nevertheless, a more realistic assumption might be that
transfers can be enacted ex-post at some cost, and this cost varies case by case. This could help explain why
some of the disputes are settled before going to court, as we discuss in section 4.3.
9As indicated in the text above and further discussed in note 8, we do not allow governments to make
transfers to each other, but policies that maximize their joint surplus are ￿rst-best from an ex-ante perspec-
tive, provided that ex-ante governments are symmetrically positioned. See also note 30.
10That payo⁄ levels are not veri￿able is a standard assumption in this kind of model (this assumption is
made also in Battigalli and Maggi, 2002, and Horn, Maggi and Staiger, 2006).
72.2 Contracting language, contracts and contracting costs
We next describe the language that is available to write a contract, the possible contracts
that can be written, and the costs of writing them. We begin by describing the contracts
that can be written with the ￿crisp￿(unambiguous) language that is typically assumed to
be available in contract theory.
Consider ￿rst the benchmark case of a complete contract, which speci￿es T as a function
of the full vector of state variables. As discussed in the previous section, the ￿rst best can




P if (s1;s2;::;sN) 2 ￿P
FT if (s1;s2;::;sN) 2 ￿FT:
This contract achieves the ￿rst best, but it is likely to be very costly to write, especially if
the number of state variables N is large. Following Battigalli and Maggi (2002) and Horn,
Maggi and Staiger (2007), we assume the cost of including a state variable in the contract
is cs. For now, we assume that specifying the policy (FT or P) is costless. The complete
contract T FB(s1;s2;::;sN) therefore costs N ￿ cs.
Given our assumption on contracting costs, it is possible to reduce these costs by writing
a contract that makes T contingent only on a subset of the state variables. The cost of such
a contract is given by n￿cs, where n is the number of state variables that are speci￿ed in the
contract. Note that, given our payo⁄ structure, if n < N the ￿rst best cannot be achieved.
In the limit, all state variables may be excluded from the contract, in which case we have
two possibilities: a completely rigid contract, which speci￿es T = FT for all states or simply
￿Free trade always;￿ 11 and the discretionary contract ￿Trade protection always allowed￿(or
equivalently, the empty contract). These two contracts represent in a very stylized way the
two types of contractual incompleteness that have been highlighted by the contract-theoretic
literature: rigidity and discretion. We label these contracts respectively R and D. According
to our contracting cost assumptions, there is no cost to writing either of these two contracts.
In addition to the crisp-language contracting possibilities described above, we now in-
troduce a language which is vague in nature, in the sense that its meaning is only partially
de￿ned. To formalize vague language we use a simple type of fuzzy logic. To illustrate,
consider a sentence F, which could sound for example like ￿there is substantial injury to the
domestic industry,￿and suppose that the truth function of sentence F is the following:
11There is no need to consider the rigid contract T = P for all s, because this is outcome-equivalent to





True if s1 = ::: = sN = 1
False if s1 = ::: = sN = 0
Undefined otherwise:
If T is made contingent on the truth value of such a sentence, something novel can be
accomplished relative to the crisp-language contracts described above: T is made responsive
to some states of the world, but in other states the contract remains vague. If for example
N = 3, with s1 = 1 (s1 = 0) when there is (is not) an import surge, s2 = 1 (s2 = 0) when
the domestic industry does (does not) shut down, and s3 = 1 (s3 = 0) when the majority
of workers in the domestic industry are (are not) unemployed, then sentence F could mean
the following: there is certainly substantial injury to the domestic industry if there is an
import surge, the domestic industry shuts down and the majority of workers in the industry
are unemployed; there is certainly not substantial injury to the domestic industry if none
of these events has occurred; but in the remaining states of the world it is not de￿ned
whether or not there is substantial injury ￿in other words, in these states it is a matter of
interpretation.12
We assume that the truth function of sentence F is common knowledge to the gov-
ernments and the court, so the governments anticipate perfectly what truth function the
court will assign to sentence F.13 Henceforth we assume that s1 ￿ (1;:::;1) 2 ￿P and
s0 ￿ (0;:::;0) 2 ￿FT. In light of the sentence F, we will sometimes refer to s1 and s0 as
￿extreme￿states, and to all others as the ￿intermediate￿states.
The vague language can be used to write what we label the vague (V ) contract: ￿Trade
protection is allowed only if there is substantial injury to the domestic industry.￿ 14 We
assume that there is no cost to writing the vague (V ) contract.15
12A richer model would allow for a multiplicity of vague sentences, some more vague than others; for
example there may be sentences that are true in more than one state and false in more than one state. Also,
among the sentences with a similar degree of vagueness, some might ￿match￿the ￿rst-best policy mapping
(in our case, FT for s 2 ￿FT and P for s 2 ￿P) better than others. In our basic model we abstract from
these issues by considering only one simple vague sentence. In the context of a richer model, this could be
interpreted as the best-performing among the set of possible vague sentences.
13In reality, there may be situations in which the contracting parties disagree on whether a given state s
falls in the ￿grey area￿or in the ￿clear area￿of a vague sentence, so one party may believe that the contract
is unambiguous for state s while the other party believes that it is a matter of interpretation. In e⁄ect,
then, we are ruling out disagreements on the nature of trade disputes. This seems like a natural simplifying
assumption, at least as a ￿rst step.
14We could alternatively consider a contract that says ￿There must be Free Trade unless there is substantial
injury,￿or ￿Protection is allowed if and only if there is substantial injury.￿Both of these contracts impose
a constraint ultimately only in state s0 and hence are equivalent to the one considered in the text.
15Of course, the performance of the V contract will depend in part on the likelihood of the ￿extreme￿
states s1 = ::: = sN = 1 and s1 = ::: = sN = 0; if N is large and the elementary events are iid these states
would have low likelihood, but recall that we allow for elementary events to have di⁄erent probabilities and
9Summarizing, we have described three forms of contract incompleteness, each of which
can reduce or eliminate the costs of contracting: rigidity, discretion and vagueness. At this
point, in principle there are many contracts that we should consider. But in order to bring
out the main insights in the simplest possible way, we assume that cs is su¢ ciently high
that specifying any state variable in the contract is suboptimal.16 Under this assumption
we can restrict attention to the three benchmark types of incomplete contract: the rigid (R)
contract, the discretionary (D) contract, and the vague (V ) contract.
Finally, we have assumed that the R, D and V contracts cost nothing to write. But
notice that, unlike the D contract, both the R and V contracts would cost something to
write if specifying the policy (FT or P) were costly. Later we will introduce a small cost of
specifying the policy as a way to break ties between the discretionary contract (D) and the
rigid/vague contracts (R=V ).17
2.3 The Dispute Settlement Body
Each of the forms of incompleteness described above carries with it a particular set of pos-
sible roles that the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) might play. We begin by describing
each of the potential roles that ￿nd signi￿cant representation in the writings of legal schol-
ars of the WTO. We then identify which possible DSB roles could arise under each type
of incompleteness. Finally, we describe in detail our assumptions on DSB behavior and
information.
A ￿rst, basic role of the DSB is to oversee enforcement of the obligations in the contract.18
If an obligation is speci￿ed unambiguously in the contract, then the DSB can play a role in
helping to ensure that non-compliance would be met with appropriate punishments. To the
extent that the DSB is able to ensure enforcement, this role is clearly a desirable feature of
institutional design, and therefore we feel justi￿ed in taking this role for granted and keeping
it in the background of the model. Our analysis will thus focus on whether and to what
extent it is desirable for the DSB to go beyond a pure enforcement role.
to be correlated, so these states need not have low likelihood. Alternatively, it could be assumed that F
is true in more than one state and is false in more than one state. From this perspective, one could then
interpret each extreme state as capturing a cluster of states rather than a single state.
16This seems like a reasonable ￿rst step, since in this paper we want to focus on the potential role of the
DSB for completing an incomplete contract. Reducing cs would intuitively diminish the potential role for
the DSB, since this would make it optimal to write a more complete contract. But aside from this, it is not
clear that reducing cs would change the main qualitative insights of the paper. In any event, we leave the
exploration of the more general case for future research.
17The assumption that specifying a policy is costly would be even more compelling in a richer setting with
multiple policy dimensions. We discuss this extension brie￿ y in section 4.2.
18There is a deep question about why a DSB is needed for enforcement (see, for example, Maggi, 1999 and
Klimenko, Ramey and Watson, forthcoming). We address this question brie￿ y in section 4.4.
10Since the enforcement role of the DSB is not the focus of our model, we make the simplest
possible assumption regarding the enforcement of the contract: any obligation that is stated
unambiguously in the contract is automatically enforced by the WTO, just as in a standard
contracting model where the contract is automatically enforced by a court.19 A more realistic
assumption would be that the DSB intervenes to enforce contractual obligations only if it is
invoked by a government (enforcement ￿on demand￿ ), but this would only complicate the
analysis without changing the main insights of the model.
Beyond the enforcement role, the DSB can play three potential roles:
1. Provide interpretations/clari￿cations of the contract. Under this role the DSB serves
as the interpreter of clauses and obligations that are left vague in the original contract.
We denote this DSB role by i.
2. Fill gaps in the contract. Under this role the DSB introduces new obligations that are
unambiguously not speci￿ed in the original contract. We denote this DSB role by g.20
3. Introduce exceptions to rigid aspects of the contract. Under this role the DSB modi￿es
obligations that are unambiguously speci￿ed in the original contract. We denote this
DSB role by m.
These roles span the potential (non-enforcement) activities of the DSB that ￿nd sig-
ni￿cant representation in the writings of WTO legal scholars. In e⁄ect, the interpretive
(i), gap-￿lling (g) and modi￿cation (m) roles entail DSB e⁄orts to ￿complete￿the ex-ante
contract. We will sometimes refer to a DSB whose mandate extends beyond the mere en-
forcement of the contract to include either the interpretation, gap-￿lling or modi￿cation role
as an activist DSB, and to a DSB whose mandate is con￿ned to contract enforcement as a
non-activist DSB. Note also that, with enforcement kept in the background of our model,
when we make reference henceforth to the DSB being ￿invoked￿or a ￿dispute￿arising, this
always refers to one of the three activist DSB roles.
19To be more precise, we assume that unambiguous obligations are automatically enforced unless the DSB
has a mandate to grant exceptions (which is the case under the DSB role m, to be introduced below) and is
invoked under this mandate.
20The distinction between gap-￿lling and interpretation/clari￿cation is described by Goldstein and Stein-
berg (2007, p. 20) in this way: ￿Gap-￿lling refers to judicial law-making on a question for which there is
no legal text directly on point, whereas ambiguity clari￿cation refers to judicial law-making on a question
for which there is legal text but that text needs clari￿cation.￿A similar distinction is adopted by Jackson
(2006, p. 184): ￿In some cases, there are actual gaps in the treaty, in other words, the treaty is totally
silent with regard to how it should apply in some circumstances. In other cases, there is treaty language
that is applicable, but the treaty language is su¢ ciently ambiguous that it could reasonably be interpreted
in several di⁄erent ways.￿
11To be clear, the language of the WTO Agreement provides explicitly for an interpretive
(i) role of the DSB, but it would seem to rule out the possibility that the WTO DSB could
serve the modi￿cation (m) or gap-￿lling (g) roles. As Article 3, paragraph 2 of the WTO
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes indicates:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members
recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under
the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights
and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
Nevertheless, gap-￿lling (adding obligations) and modi￿cation (diminishing obligations) ac-
tivities of the WTO DSB are frequently discussed in both positive and normative contexts
by legal scholars (see, for example, Goldstein and Steinberg, 2007, and WTO, 2007). As
such, we include them as important and relevant potential DSB activities to evaluate.21
We may now describe which of the activist roles identi￿ed above are relevant for each
of the three forms of contractual incompleteness. In the case of discretion (D), only the
role of gap-￿lling (g) is relevant. In the case of rigidity (R), only the role of modi￿cation of
obligations (m) is relevant. And in the case of vagueness (V ), only the interpretation role (i)
is relevant.22
Whatever the role played by the DSB, we assume that there are costs of a dispute should
it occur. In particular, whenever the exporter (complainant) invokes the DSB, the exporter
incurs cost c￿ and the importer (defendant) incurs cost c.23 We have in mind the costs
of litigation, which for each disputant will re￿ ect various administrative costs, the costs of
lawyers and the cost of acquiring in-house expertise, the burden of proof, etc., but in the
model we treat these costs as parameters.
21It is also possible to ￿nd examples of courts playing a modi￿cation-type role in domestic settings, where
the court may void an obligation in the contract (see, for example, Anderlini, Felli and Postlewaite, 2006,
2007).
22We feel justi￿ed in referring to the utter emptiness of the D contract as a ￿gap,￿because in a richer
model the contract could be empty along some dimensions while including non-empty clauses along other
dimensions. Also, for the more general case of our basic model in which cs may be low, the optimal contract
may have rigidity, discretion and vagueness (or a subset of these) at the same time, and so the DSB may
play more than one of the activist roles; our basic model represents an attempt to focus more sharply on the
trade-o⁄s between the various roles.
23We could also allow for a ￿xed cost of the DSB, but this would not change our qualitative results
regarding the optimal choice among non-empty contracts, because a DSB must be present at least in an
enforcement role for any such contract, and so the ￿xed cost would have to be incurred in any event.
12We next describe our model of DSB behavior. We assume that the DSB always operates
in accordance with its mandate. Thus, there are three possible circumstances under which
a dispute might arise in our model: (1) if the contract is discretionary (D) and the DSB has
a gap-￿lling (g) role, there may be a dispute in any state for which there is no contractually
stipulated obligation (i.e., there may be a dispute in any state s); (2) if the contract is vague
(V ) and the DSB has an interpretation (i) role, there may be a dispute in any state for
which the contractually stipulated obligation is left vague (i.e., there may be a dispute in
any intermediate state s); and (3) if the contract is rigid (R) and the DSB has a modi￿cation
of obligations (m) role, there may be a dispute in any state for which the contractually
stipulated obligation is rigid (i.e., there may be a dispute in any state s).
As we noted in section 2.1, the DSB is assumed to observe the realized state s but not the
value of ￿; thus, the DSB does not know what the ￿best￿(joint-payo⁄-maximizing) policy
is for the realized state s. We assume that, if invoked, the DSB observes a noisy signal
of ￿, which can be interpreted as the outcome of an independent investigation. The DSB
then issues a ruling ￿which is simply a policy determination T DSB for the realized state
￿with the objective of maximizing the expected joint payo⁄ of the governments given the
signal.24 Note that the DSB ruling T DSB ￿lls a gap in the D contract in case (1) above, it
interprets a vague obligation in the V contract in case (2) above, and it simply ignores the
obligation stipulated by the R contract in case (3) above.25 We assume that DSB rulings
are automatically enforced.
We now describe in more detail our assumptions concerning the information available
24By our assumption that the DSB maximizes the joint payo⁄ of the governments, we seek to capture the
DSB￿ s attempt to complete the contract for the realized state in the same way that the governments would
have done ex ante. In essence, this is what the WTO DSB is supposed to attempt. For example, in WTO
(2005), the Appellate Body states: ￿We recall that Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention stipulates that:
￿ A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.￿ ... Importantly, the ordinary meaning
of a treaty term must be seen in the light of the intention of the parties...￿(emphasis added). Even if this is
what the WTO DSB is supposed to attempt, there is of course an implementation issue of ensuring that the
DSB actually attempts this: in the WTO DSB, this implementation issue may in part be addressed through
the rules on selection of panel members (for example, to enhance impartiality of the panel, no panel member
can reside in a country that is party to the dispute) and through the appeals process. Finally, there is a
remaining question whether alternative DSB objectives might better serve the governments. We consider
this question brie￿ y in section 4.
25Notice that, conditional on being invoked, our model has the DSB behaving in the same way regardless
of the nature of contract incompleteness. In a richer model this feature might be relaxed: for example,
the DSB might have a better sense of the ruling that would best serve the member governments when the
contract is vague and the DSB￿ s role is to interpret what the governments had in mind than when the
contract is discretionary and there is simply a gap for the DSB to ￿ll; a similar observation might apply
when comparing the rigid contract to the discretionary contract, and in each case our assumptions abstract
from this feature. In e⁄ect, our modeling approach accepts this simpli￿cation as a reasonable compromise
for maintaining tractability.
13to the DSB. Consider the moment in time when the DSB is invoked, before it observes the
signal of ￿. From this time on, the state s is known with certainty, so it will appear in
the notation to follow as a deterministic variable. The DSB has some prior beliefs on ￿,
represented by the distribution fs(￿). We assume that, for any state s, the DSB priors on ￿
are uninformative, so that Prs(￿ > 0) = Prs(￿ < 0) = 1=2 for all s.26
We let ￿DSB denote the signal of ￿ observed by the DSB, and hs(￿DSBj￿) its distrib-
ution conditional on ￿. We assume that the signal is unbiased, and more speci￿cally that
hs(￿DSBj￿) is symmetric and centered around ￿.
A simple measure of the noise in the DSB signal is q(s) ￿ Prs(￿DSB sgn
6= ￿); this is the
probability that, given state s, the DSB signal has the opposite sign from the true ￿. Since
the DSB priors are uninformative, it is easy to show that the DSB will issue the ruling
T DSB = P if and only if it observes a signal ￿DSB > 0.27 Note that, if the DSB observes
no signal at all, it is indi⁄erent between choosing FT and P, and hence it randomizes in
its ruling; this is the benchmark case of maximum DSB noise. Thus, q(s) represents the
probability that the DSB issues the ￿wrong￿ruling when playing an active role.
Note that, since the distribution of ￿DSB conditional on ￿ is symmetric, q(s) is bounded
above by 1=2. For the purposes of comparative-static analysis, we will consider equi-
proportional changes in the precision of the DSB signal, letting q(s) ￿ q ￿ k(s), where
k(s) 2 [0;1=2] for all s and q 2 [0;1] is a parameter that captures (inversely) the overall
quality of the DSB information. We will vary q while keeping k(s) ￿xed. The case q = 0
corresponds to the case in which the DSB has perfect information.
2.4 The possible institutions and the timing of events
Collecting all the possibilities that we have discussed above for the contract and the potential
roles of the DSB, we have the following candidate institutions:28
Contract
DSB Role Discretion Rigidity Vagueness








Observe that the institution Dn delivers the noncooperative equilibrium outcome, and so
26We could allow the DSB priors on ￿ to be informative. This would imply a slightly more complicated
updating rule for the DSB, but the results of the model would not be a⁄ected.
27The DSB chooses T to maximize E(￿(T)j￿DSB) ￿where we have omitted the argument s ￿so it chooses
T = P i⁄E(￿(P)j￿DSB)￿E(￿(FT)j￿DSB) > 0, or E(￿(P)￿￿(FT)j￿DSB) > 0 or ￿nally E(￿j￿DSB) > 0.
But since the signal is unbiased, E(￿j￿DSB) = ￿DSB which proves the claim.
28In a richer model these forms of contract-incompleteness/DSB-roles could well co-exist in the same
institution. But for simplicity we use use the term ￿institution￿to refer to the contract/DSB-role pairing.
14amounts to no institution; the drawback of Dn of course is that it does nothing to prevent
opportunistic behavior by governments. The institution Rn prevents opportunistic behav-
ior but its rigid insistence on free trade implies that it sometimes gets the policy wrong.
The institution Vn prescribes the correct policy in the extreme states s0 and s1, but in the
intermediate states the importer e⁄ectively has discretion and so the wrong policy is some-
times chosen under Vn as well. Finally, the institutions Dg, Rm and Vi entail high DSB-use
costs and subject governments to potential DSB error as the DSB works to ￿complete￿the
contract.
We describe now the timing of events. We start with a game that is essentially static.
In the dynamic extension that we consider in the next section, this game is repeated and a
number of additional issues can be explored. But many of the main points are best illustrated
in the simple static setting of this section. We consider the following timing:
stage 0. The institution is created (the contract is written, specifying the substantive obligations
and the mandate of the DSB).
stage 1. The state (s1;s2;::;sN) is realized.
stage 2. The importer government chooses the policy T 2 fFT;Pg.
stage 3. The exporter government decides whether to ￿le a complaint with the DSB.
stage 4. If invoked, the DSB issues a ruling within its mandate T DSB 2 fFT;Pg.
stage 5. If the DSB rules against the defendant (T 6= T DSB), the import policy is modi￿ed to
comply with the DSB ruling.
stage 6. Trades occur and payo⁄s are realized.
We can allow governments to renegotiate, both after the state (s1;s2;::;sN) is realized in
stage 1, and after the DSB issues a ruling in stage 4 (these are the two relevant renegotiation
nodes, because at each of these nodes governments receive some new information). But note
that, since transfers between governments are not available, the possibility of renegotiation
is irrelevant in this setting. This is because the interests of the two governments are di-
rectly in con￿ ict and no Pareto improvement is possible ex-post; hence there is no room for
renegotiation.
152.5 Analysis
We look for the institution ^ I 2 fDn;Dg;Rn;Rm;Vn;Vig that maximizes the governments￿
ex-ante joint payo⁄ E￿(^ T(I);s), where ^ T(I) is the (subgame-perfect) equilibrium policy
that emerges under institution I.29;30
Let us ￿rst consider the institutions with a non-activist DSB (Dn;Rn;Vn). Recall that
in each of these cases, the DSB has no mandate to ￿complete￿the contract, and no disputes
can arise. The comparison between these three institutions is therefore straightforward.
Under the institution Dn, clearly the equilibrium outcome is the policy P for all realiza-
tions of s. Under the institution Rn, the equilibrium outcome is FT for all s. And under
the institution Vn ￿recalling that the V contract calls for FT in state s0 and for P in state
s1, while for all other states the obligations are left vague and hence nothing is enforced ￿
the equilibrium outcome is for the importing government to select FT in state s0 and P in
all other states.
We can now compare the institutions Dn, Rn and Vn in terms of the ex-ante joint payo⁄.
First note that Vn performs strictly better than Dn: the former imposes FT in state s0 and
allows P in the other states, whereas the latter allows P in all states; thus Dn implements
the wrong policy in one more state than Vn. So we can ignore the institution Dn.
We turn next to a comparison of Rn and Vn. It is convenient to compare these contracts









In general the ranking between these two institutions is ambiguous, and it depends on the
intensity of the preference for FT in states s 2 ￿FT versus the intensity of the preference for
P in states s 2 ￿P. Our main results will hold regardless of this ranking.
We next turn to consider the institutions with an activist DSB: Dg, Rm, and Vi. It is
helpful to distinguish between two cases: (a) those states s where, for the given institution,
the activist role of the DSB is not applicable; and (b) those states s where the activist role of
the DSB is applicable (under its mandate). In case (a), the equilibrium outcome is exactly as
characterized above for the case of a non-activist DSB, while in case (b) we have to consider
29In this setting the equilibrium policy will be unique for each institution.
30There are three ways to justify the assumption that the institution is chosen to maximize the govern-
ments￿joint payo⁄: one possibility is to allow for ex-ante transfers, i.e., tranfers at the time the institution is
created (see note 8); a second possibilty is to keep the single-sector model and introduce a veil of ignorance,
so that ex-ante there is uncertainty over which of the two governments will be the importer and which the
exporter; and a third possibility is to introduce a second mirror-image sector.
16the possibility of disputes and derive the equilibrium outcome by backward induction.
Note that, within the set of activist-DSB institutions ￿Dg, Rm, and Vi ￿case (a) applies
only for Vi, and only then under states s0 and s1; for all other states and institutions, case (b)
applies. Thus, the equilibrium outcome for the institution Vi in states s0 and s1 is the same
as for the institution Vn examined above. It remains to determine equilibrium government
behavior for all those states and institutions in which case (b) applies.
Consider ￿rst the exporter government￿ s ￿ling behavior. For a state s where the activist
role of the DSB is applicable under the given institution, the exporter government ￿les a
complaint if and only if T = P and the expected bene￿t to the exporter government of ￿ling
exceeds the exporter government￿ s cost of ￿ling, that is
Pr(DSB ruling is FT j s) ￿ j￿
￿(s)j > c
￿: (F)
Condition (F) is the ￿￿ling￿condition for the exporter government to invoke the DSB in
response to a policy choice by the importer government of T = P.
Next consider the importer government￿ s policy choice in a state s where the activist
role of the DSB is applicable under the given institution. The importer government chooses
T = P if either (F) fails ￿because then the importer government can set T = P without
triggering a dispute ￿or if (F) holds and the expected bene￿t to the importer government
from trade protection exceeds the cost to the importer government of a DSB dispute:
Pr(DSB ruling is P j s) ￿ ￿(s) > c: (P)
To reduce the number of cases and focus on the more interesting ones, we assume that
for each disputant the cost of a dispute is relatively small. More speci￿cally, we assume that
even in the benchmark case of maximal DSB noise, i.e. even where the DSB randomizes








￿(s) > c for all s: (2)
Condition (2) implies that c￿ and c are su¢ ciently small so that, for any level of DSB noise,
(i) if the ￿rst best policy is P, the importer government chooses P whether or not this
triggers a complaint by the exporter government, and (ii) if the ￿rst best policy is FT but
the importer government still chooses P, the exporter government ￿les a complaint.
We can now examine more closely each of the activist-DSB institutions Dg, Rm, and Vi.
Consider ￿rst the institution Dg. It is direct to derive the equilibrium actions of the
governments for each state:
171. In states s 2 ￿FT: if qk(s) < c
￿(s) then T = FT and the DSB is not invoked; if instead
qk(s) > c
￿(s) then T = P and the DSB is invoked.31
2. In states s 2 ￿P: if qk(s) < c￿
j￿￿(s)j then T = P and the DSB is not invoked; if instead
qk(s) > c￿
j￿￿(s)j then T = P and the DSB is invoked.
Notice an interesting feature of the Dg institution: the expected quality of DSB rulings
has a perverse e⁄ect on the equilibrium utilization of the DSB, in the sense that the DSB is
invoked more frequently in equilibrium when the accuracy of its rulings is low (i.e., when q is
high). Speci￿cally, in states s 2 ￿FT, the importing government chooses the ine¢ cient policy
P and induces a DSB ￿ling by the exporting government if and only if qk(s) ￿the probability
that the DSB will rule in error ￿is su¢ ciently high. Similarly, in states s 2 ￿P, the exporting
government chooses to ￿le with the DSB and challenge the importing government￿ s e¢ cient
policy choice P if and only if qk(s) is su¢ ciently high. Note also that, for a given state s, the
￿rst best outcome is achieved if and only if the DSB is not invoked.32 These two observations
play a central role in the analysis to follow, and indeed they are at the heart of the main
results of this section. Together they imply that the equilibrium motives that trigger a DSB
￿ling are ine¢ cient from an ex-ante perspective, and it is the o⁄-equilibrium impacts of the
activist role of the DSB that are e¢ ciency-enhancing.
We are now in a position to calculate the expected e¢ ciency loss associated with the







FT is the set of states under the Dg institution for which Free Trade is e¢ cient, the
importing government chooses to protect, and the exporting government ￿les a complaint
(i.e., s such that s 2 ￿FT and qk(s) > c
￿(s)), ^ ￿
P is the set of states under the Dg institution for
which Protection is e¢ cient, the importing government chooses to protect, and the exporting
government ￿les a complaint (i.e., s such that s 2 ￿P and qk(s) > c￿
j￿￿(s)j), and call ￿ c + c￿.
31To see this, note that condition (F) in this state is (1￿qk(s))￿j￿￿(s)j > c￿, or qk(s) < 1￿ c
￿
j￿￿(s)j; given
(2) this is always satis￿ed, hence the exporter ￿les i⁄ T = P. Condition (P) is given by qk(s) ￿ ￿(s) > c, or
qk(s) > c
￿(s); thus the importer chooses T = P i⁄ qk(s) > c
￿(s), as claimed. The claim about states s 2 ￿P
that we make below can be shown analogously.
32This particular feature depends on the assumption that c and c￿ are relatively small. If c and c￿ were
large, ine¢ cient policies would arise also for states where the DSB is not invoked in equilibrium. This is
because the threat of invoking the DSB may not be credible if the cost of doing so is high. In this case
(which might potentially be relevant for small developing countries, but probably not for large or developed
countries), intuitively the role of the DSB would be diminished, but our main qualitative results would still
hold, at least to the extent that c and c￿ are not prohibitive, i.e. so high that they shut down the impact of
the DSB altogether.
18Notice that in the set of states ^ ￿
FT, it is the importer government who acts opportunistically
and exploits the incompleteness of the contract, thereby triggering a dispute; and in the set
of states ^ ￿
P, it is the exporter government who acts opportunistically and exploits the
incompleteness of the contract, thereby triggering a dispute.
As (3) makes clear, the institution Dg entails two ine¢ ciencies relative to the ￿rst-best:
one arising from the probability of DSB error in its activist role, and the other arising from
the cost of the dispute. The expected loss L(Dg) is given by this double ine¢ ciency summed
over two sets of states: the set of states ^ ￿
FT for which FT is the ￿rst best policy, the importer
government exploits a gap in the contract and there will be a dispute in equilibrium; and
the set of states ^ ￿
P for which P is the ￿rst best policy, the exporter government exploits a
gap in the contract and there will be a dispute in equilibrium.
Note that L(Dg) is increasing in q according to (3), for two reasons. First, a higher q
implies more frequent mistakes by the DSB when the DSB is invoked, and this increases
the expected cost of DSB error given a dispute in any state s, qk(s)j￿(s)j. And second, as
we have observed above, a higher q also increases the number of states in which the DSB is
invoked in equilibrium, and therefore increases the size of the sets ^ ￿
FT and ^ ￿
P.
Also note from (3) that no loss arises (L(Dg) = 0) if q is lower than a critical level ~ q > 0.
This is the level of q below which the DSB is not invoked in any state (that is, the level of q
below which the sets ^ ￿
FT and ^ ￿
P are empty). Intuitively, if the DSB noise is small (q < ~ q)
then the governments, expecting the DSB (in its active role) to make the right decision with
high probability, will act e¢ ciently and avoid the DSB intervention to save on the dispute
cost (the importer will always choose the ￿rst best policy and the exporter will never ￿le
complaints). This re￿ ects the o⁄-equilibrium impacts of the DSB described above.
Consider next the institution Rm. Under this institution, the contract speci￿es a rigid
free trade rule, but the DSB can allow exceptions if invoked. Notice, though, that the
DSB is unconstrained by the (rigid) contract when its mandate includes the modi￿cation
of obligations (m), and hence if invoked, the DSB makes the same ruling as it would under
the discretionary contract. But it should now be clear that the equilibrium outcome under
Rm must then be the same as under Dg. This is because the DSB will rule in the same way
in both cases, hence the governments will make the same decisions in both cases ￿the fact
that under Rm the contract speci￿es free trade is irrelevant at the end of the day. Based
on this observation, and applying our tie-breaking assumption ￿a small cost of specifying
the policy (FT or P) that raises the contracting cost of Rm slightly above Dg ￿we conclude
that Rm is dominated by Dg.
Finally consider the institution Vi. Clearly, in all intermediate states (i.e., states other
than the extreme states s0 and s1), the equilibrium government actions are the same as those
19we have described above under the institution Dg. But in states s0 and s1 things may be
di⁄erent, because in these states, as we have already observed, the activist role of the DSB
is not applicable under the institution Vi, and hence there is no dispute cost in these states
and the equilibrium outcome is ￿rst-best, that is, respectively T = FT and T = P.
We are now in a position to calculate the expected e¢ ciency loss associated with the






where ￿ ￿FT = ^ ￿
FTns0 and ￿ ￿P = ^ ￿
Pns1. The interpretation of L(Vi) is the same as that given
for L(Dg), except that the sets ￿ ￿FT and ￿ ￿P now replace ^ ￿
FT and ^ ￿
P: the set ￿ ￿FT is the set of
states for which FT is the ￿rst best policy, the importer government exploits the vagueness
of the contract and there will be a dispute in equilibrium; and the set ￿ ￿P is the set of states
for which P is the ￿rst best policy, the exporter government exploits the vagueness of the
contract and there will be a dispute in equilibrium.
To compare the performance of the Dg and Vi institutions, we de￿ne ￿ q ￿ min( c
k(s0)￿(s0); c￿
k(s1)j￿￿(s1)j).
It is direct to verify that, if q < ￿ q, the DSB will not be invoked in the extreme states s0 and
s1 under the Dg institution, and the equilibrium outcome is respectively T = FT and T = P.
But this corresponds exactly to the outcome under the Vi institution in the extreme state
s0 and s1; and as we have already observed, the equilibrium outcome under Dg and Vi is
always the same for intermediate state realizations. Hence, if q < ￿ q, the equilibrium outcome
under Dg is the same as under Vi in all (intermediate and extreme) states. By contrast, if
q > ￿ q, the DSB will be invoked in at least one of the extreme states s0 and/or s1 under the
Dg institution, implying that the double ine¢ ciency described above will be incurred in at
least one of these states under the Dg institution, and implying as a consequence that the
expected e¢ ciency loss under Dg is higher than under Vi. Thus for q > ￿ q we ￿nd using (3)
and (4) that Vi is strictly preferred to Dg, while for q < ￿ q we have a tie. That is:
L(Dg) > L(Vi) if q > ￿ q; and L(Dg) = L(Vi) if q < ￿ q:
Applying again our tie-breaking assumption ￿that specifying the policy (FT or P) entails
a small cost, raising the contracting cost of Vi slightly above Dg ￿we conclude that Vi is
better than Dg if q > ￿ q, and vice versa if q < ￿ q. Note that, if k(s0) and k(s1) are small, so
that the DSB would have a very good idea about the ￿right￿policy in the extreme states,
then ￿ q is higher than one, and therefore q < ￿ q for all q 2 [0;1]; in this case Dg is preferred
to Vi for all q 2 [0;1].
20We are now ready to draw our conclusions about the optimal institution. We have
narrowed the choice to four institutions: Vn; Rn; Vi and Dg. The best of these institutions
is the one that minimizes the expected e¢ ciency loss L. First note from (1) that L(Vn) and
L(Rn) are both independent of q, and hence the ranking between Vn and Rn does not depend
on q. Next recall from (3) and (4) that Vi is preferred to Dg i⁄ q > ￿ q. Finally note from (4)
and (1) that Vn is preferred to Vi i⁄ q is above a threshold level,33 and the same can be said
for the ranking between Rn and Vi. Putting together these results, we have the following:
Proposition 1 There exist critical levels q1 and q2 (with 0 < q1 ￿ q2 ￿ 1) such that: for
q < q1 the optimal institution is Dg; for q1 < q < q2 the optimal institution is Vi; and for
q > q2 the optimal institution is either Vn or Rn.
Proposition 1 carries with it a number of implications. We highlight ￿ve of these below.
First, Proposition 1 implies that leaving gaps in a contract can be optimal, but only when
the DSB is given an activist mandate; by contrast, introducing rigidity into a contract can be
optimal, but only when the DSB is given a non-activist mandate; and ￿nally vague clauses
can be optimal under either an activist or non-activist DSB mandate (although note that
each of the intervals (q1;q2) and (q2;1) may be empty). More broadly, these observations
re￿ ect a simple underlying point: it is optimal to leave governments with discretion in more
states of the world and endow the DSB with a mandate to rein in the exercise of that
discretion the better the quality of the DSB information.
Second, Proposition 1 implies that, if q is su¢ ciently small, the ￿rst best outcome can
be achieved under Dg or possibly Vi even though (i) the contract is highly incomplete, (ii)
the use of the DSB is costly, and (iii) the DSB rulings are imperfect. The reason is that
the threat of invoking the DSB and the expectation of a su¢ ciently precise DSB ruling is
su¢ cient to induce governments to act e¢ ciently. But notice that the ￿rst-best cannot be
achieved if the DSB is not given an activist mandate.
Third, Proposition 1 implies that there is no modi￿cation role for the DSB in the optimal
institution, contrary to the suggestions of some legal scholars (see WTO, 2007). Intuitively,
rather than placing a rigid obligation into the contract and then endowing the DSB with a
mandate to modify the obligation ex post, it is always better to simply leave a gap in the
contract to begin with and then endow the DSB with a mandate to ￿ll the gap ex post.
Fourth, Proposition 1 suggests an interesting question: Can an activist DSB role be
desirable even if the DSB has no information in any state and simply randomizes (i.e. even
33To see this, note that (i) L(Vn) > L(Vi) for q = 0; and (ii) L(Vi) is increasing in q. It follows that Vn is
preferred to Vi i⁄ q is above a threshold level qv. Note that qv may be higher than one, in which case Vi is
preferred to Vn for all q 2 [0;1].
21if q = 1 and k(s) = 1=2 ￿ k for all s, so that qk = 1=2)? Under these conditions, if




2p(s0)j￿(s0)j, which implies L(Vi) > min[L(Rn);L(Vn)]. Our
model therefore predicts that, at least if the costs of a dispute are su¢ ciently small, the DSB
needs to have at least some information if an activist DSB role is to improve e¢ ciency.
And ￿nally, a corollary of Proposition 1 is that the probability of a DSB dispute ￿
and hence the expected cost of disputes ￿is non-monotonic in q, and in particular it is
increasing for low levels of q and decreasing for high levels of q (provided the interval (q2;1)
is nonempty). The reason is that when q is su¢ ciently low the DSB is not invoked at all in
equilibrium, and when q is su¢ ciently close to 1 it is optimal to have a non-activist DSB.
Notice as well that, because the e¢ ciency achieved by the optimal institution is decreasing
in q, there is a nonmonotonic relationship between the equilibrium frequency of DSB use and
the performance of the optimal institution. Therefore, our model implies that one cannot
rely on information about the equilibrium frequency of DSB use to gain information about
the performance of the optimal institution in terms of how close it gets to the ￿rst best.
2.6 A pro-trade bias in the DSB?
It has been pointed out in the literature on WTO disputes that there is an apparent ￿pro-
trade bias￿in DSB rulings. For example, according to the WTO (WTO, 2007, p. 273),
￿...both under the GATT (82 per cent) and the WTO (88 per cent) complainants have
mostly won their cases (counting the ones that went through to an adopted report and
￿ decisive￿ruling respectively).￿In an e⁄ort to o⁄er an interpretation of this bias, Goldstein
and Steinberg (2007) argue that, if it is costly for the exporter to ￿le a dispute, there may
be a pro-trade (selection) bias in DSB rulings, because the exporter will ￿le only when there
is a high probability of success.
In this section we show that our model points to a somewhat di⁄erent interpretation of
this pro-trade bias in DSB rulings. Rather than the absolute level of dispute costs faced by
the exporter, our model suggests that this bias arises when the costs of dispute fall su¢ ciently
on the exporter relative to the importer (re￿ ecting, perhaps, the allocation of the burden
of proof). Intuitively, as we demonstrate below, a pro-trade bias in DSB rulings arises in
our model when disputes are mostly triggered as a result of the importer ￿rather than the
exporter ￿acting opportunistically and exploiting the incompleteness of the contract, and
this occurs when the exporter (importer) faces relatively high (low) dispute costs.
We also raise a related question: Under what conditions do the equilibrium policy out-
comes skew in favor of free trade relative to the ￿rst best outcome, and in this sense exhibit
22a pro-trade bias? One might conjecture that the two dimensions of bias ￿the bias in rulings
and the bias in policy outcomes ￿would go in the same direction, but interestingly, we will
show that the two biases are inversely related: if there is a pro-trade bias in DSB rulings,
then there tends to be an anti-trade bias in policy outcomes, and vice versa.
We ￿rst consider the bias in DSB rulings. In order to focus on selection as the only source
of bias, we assume that if disputes were initiated randomly, the outcome of disputes would













where to avoid unnecessary notation we now use q(s) rather than qk(s) as our (inverse)
measure of the quality of DSB information. Condition (5) says that the ￿rst-best policy is
FT or P with equal probability. Condition (6) says that the DSB error is not correlated
with the ￿rst-best policy.35
For simplicity we consider only the Dg institution, but similar results apply to the Vi
institution. Recalling that ^ ￿
FT denotes the subset of ￿FT in which a dispute is ￿led under
the Dg institution and similarly ^ ￿
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It follows from (7) using condition (5) and condition (6) that Pr(T DSB = FT j ￿le) > 1=2 if
34By focusing on selection bias we abstract from other possible causes of the observed bias in DSB rulings.
For example, the underlying cause might be simply that the probability of being in the set ￿FT is higher
than 1=2. This is a possible explanation, but not a very interesting one. The analysis of this section should
be interpreted as shedding light on the determinants of selection bias, not as suggesting that selection bias
is the only possible explanation for the observed bias in DSB rulings.




s2￿FT p(s) gives the probability of DSB error conditional on




s2￿P p(s) gives the probability of DSB error conditional on s 2 ￿P. Given




s2￿P q(s)p(s), which is
condition (6).
23and only if X
s2^ ￿FT
(1 ￿ 2q(s))p(s) >
X
s2^ ￿P
(1 ￿ 2q(s))p(s): (8)
Our goal now is to identify the region in (c;c￿)-space where (8) holds. First note that, if
c < mins2￿FT q(s)￿(s) and c￿ < mins2￿P q(s)j￿￿(s)j, ￿ling occurs in equilibrium in every state
s. In this case, clearly there is no bias. Next focus on the case in which c > mins2￿FT q(s)￿(s)
or c￿ > mins2￿P q(s)j￿￿(s)j, so that ￿ling occurs in some but not all states. Recall that, by
our small-cost assumption (2), the number of states in ^ ￿
FT depends only on c (and is weakly
decreasing in c) and the number of states in ^ ￿
P depends only on c￿ (and is weakly decreasing
in c￿). This implies that the left hand side of (8) is a weakly decreasing function of c and
the right hand side of (8) is a weakly decreasing function of c￿. It follows immediately that
(8) is satis￿ed if and only if c￿ > h(c), where h(￿) is a weakly increasing function. Thus,
at a broad level we ￿nd that DSB rulings tend to have a pro-trade bias if the dispute costs
incurred by the exporter are high relative to the dispute costs incurred by the importer.
We next characterize the bias in the policy outcomes under the Dg institution (again,
similar results apply to the Vi institution). Since we are assuming here that the ￿rst-best
policy is FT or P with equal probability, it is natural to say that the policy outcome exhibits
a pro-trade bias if Pr(^ T(Dg) = FT) > 1=2, where recall that ^ T(Dg) is the equilibrium policy
that emerges under institution Dg.
A key observation is that, in the sets of states where no dispute is ￿led (i.e. ￿Pn^ ￿
P and
￿FTn^ ￿
FT), the equilibrium policy is the ￿rst-best policy. Using this observation, and with
some straightforward algebra, we can write:









































Intuitively, there is no bias in policy outcomes under the Dg institution if no disputes ever
arise, because as we have shown in that case the equilibrium policy is always the ￿rst-best
policy; and so, as (9) indicates, the extent of anti- or pro- trade bias in policy outcomes
24depends on the relative size of the sets ^ ￿
FT and ^ ￿
P.
Using arguments analogous to those above for the analysis of bias in DSB rulings, it is
straightforward to show that (9) is satis￿ed if and only if c￿ < g(c), where g(￿) is a weakly
increasing function. Thus, in sharp contrast with our ￿nding concerning the bias in DSB
rulings, we ￿nd that the policy outcomes tend to exhibit a pro-trade bias if the dispute costs
incurred by the exporter are low relative to the dispute costs incurred by the importer. This
result becomes even more crisp in the special case where q(s) and p(s) are the same for all
states. In that case, it is direct to see that the two curves h(c) and g(c) coincide, and hence
(9) is satis￿ed if and only if (8) is violated, and vice-versa.
The following proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 2 Consider the Dg and Vi institutions: (i) There is a pro-trade bias in DSB
rulings if and only if c￿ > h(c), where h(￿) is a (weakly) increasing function. (ii) There
is a pro-trade bias in policy outcomes if and only if c￿ < g(c), where g(￿) is a (weakly)
increasing function. (iii) In the symmetric case where q(s) = q for all s and p(s) = p for all
s, h(c) = g(c), and hence there is a pro-trade bias in DSB rulings if and only if there is an
anti-trade bias in policy outcomes.
Figure 1 conveys the main message of Proposition 2 for the symmetric case where q(s) = q
for all s and p(s) = p for all s:36 the conditions leading to a pro-trade bias in the DSB
rulings are essentially the same as those leading to an anti-trade bias in the policy outcomes.
Evidently, our model suggests that when c￿ is high relative to c, the joint behavior that
is induced by both the importer government and the exporter government under the Dg
and Vi institutions means that the most common reason for a dispute to arise is because
the importer government is trying to exploit the incompleteness of the contract and ￿get
away with protection￿(rather than the alternative that the exporter government is trying to
exploit the incompleteness of the contract and ￿get away with forcing free trade￿ ); and this
ensures that the policy outcomes tend to be biased toward Protection relative to the ￿rst best
policies even though the DSB, when invoked, will usually ￿nd in favor of the complainant
and rule for Free Trade.
36In Figure 1, we de￿ne c1 ￿ mins2￿FT q(s)￿(s), c￿
1 ￿ mins2￿P q(s)j￿￿(s)j, c2 ￿ maxs2￿FT q(s)￿(s) and
c￿
2 ￿ maxs2￿P q(s)j￿￿(s)j. Note that by our assumption (2) we can focus on the region where c < c2 and
c￿ < c￿
2. Also note that the ￿No-Bias￿locus is technically not a function but a correspondence, due to the
discrete nature of the state space. If the state space were continuous this locus would be a curve.
253 Precedent Setting
We next develop a dynamic extension of the static model described in the previous section.
With this dynamic extension, we consider a further important issue of DSB design: whether
or not DSB rulings should set legal precedent for future rulings.
3.1 A two-period model
For simplicity, we consider a two-period version of the static model developed above, with
a prior period (Period 0) in which the institution is created. Period 1 and Period 2 then
proceed as in the static model of the previous section. We assume that the state (s1;s2;:::;sN)
is iid across the two periods,37 and we let ￿ ￿ 0 denote the factor by which governments
discount Period-2 welfare: because ￿the future￿is collapsed into Period 2, we allow that
￿ may be arbitrarily large. Finally, we denote by Tt and T DSB
t (t 2 f1;2g) the Period-t
importer-government policy choice and DSB ruling, respectively. Given that Period 2 is the
repetition of Period 1, and given the iid assumption, there is nothing truly dynamic in the
contracting environment. The dynamic aspect of the analysis will arise from the presence of
the DSB institution, if the DSB has precedent-setting authority.
As in the static model, we can allow the governments to renegotiate the contract at two
stages within each period: after the state (s1;s2;::;sN) is realized in stage 1, and after the
DSB issues a ruling in stage 4. From the perspective of Period 2, the two possibilities for
renegotiation look identical to those in the static model; that is, since transfers between
governments are not available, the possibility of renegotiation ￿both at the end of stage
1 and at the end of stage 4 ￿is irrelevant in Period 2. This is because in Period 2, as
in the static model, the interests of the two governments are directly in con￿ ict and no
Pareto improvement is possible ex-post; hence there is no room for renegotiation. But does
this conclusion hold as well from the perspective of Period 1? After all, if DSB rulings set
a precedent for the future, it seems plausible that governments might want to renegotiate
after a ￿bad￿ruling in stage 4. Nevertheless, upon further re￿ ection it can be seen that the
￿winning￿country under the DSB ruling in Period 1 would never agree to a renegotiation
without the possibility of transfers.38 Hence, we may conclude that there is no room for
renegotiation in our dynamic model.
37At the end of the section we consider an extension of the model that allows for persistence in the state
of the world, in order to examine how the optimal institution depends on the degree of persistence.
38More broadly, it is tempting to think of the periodic GATT/WTO multilateral negotiating ￿Rounds￿
as environments in which government-to-government transfers can more e⁄ectively be orchestrated (see note
8) and where the precedent set by ￿bad￿ DSB rulings might be addressed through renegotiation. This
interpretation, however, is well beyong the scope of our simple model.
263.2 DSB behavior and the meaning of precedent
We next describe the formal meaning of ￿precedent￿within our model. When DSB rulings
set precedent, we assume that a Period-1 ruling T DSB
1 (s0) for the realized state s0 implies
henceforth that the contract speci￿es T(s0) = T DSB
1 (s0). Therefore, if the DSB operates
under precedent and the DSB is invoked in Period 1 for the realized state s0, then in Period
2 the contract is ￿complete￿for the state s0.39
An interesting question is whether and to what extent it is costly for the DSB to describe
the realized state s0, which it must do if its ruling is to set a precedent for future realizations
of this state. In reality, this cost is probably non-negligible but signi￿cantly lower than the
cost of describing a state ex-ante, before its realization. What we have in mind is similar
to Battigalli and Maggi (2002)￿ s notion of ￿unforeseen events￿(see their Section II.B6): ex
ante there is a set of elementary events si that the contracting parties are aware of, but
also a large number of ￿latent￿elementary events that they do not have in mind because
these latent events are normally turned ￿o⁄.￿If a latent elementary event is turned ￿on￿
ex post, at that point it becomes relatively easy to describe.40 For simplicity we assume
that the cost of describing the realized state s0 is zero. This makes the di⁄erence between
ex-ante and ex-post description costs rather extreme in our model (recall the assumption
that cs, the cost of describing a state variable ex-ante, is su¢ ciently high that specifying a
contingent contract is suboptimal), but it would be easy to allow for a positive cost of ex-
post description; intuitively, this would have the straightforward e⁄ect of making precedent-
setting less attractive, other things equal.
Finally, we assume for simplicity that the DSB has no recall in Period 2 of its observed
39What we have described above is not the only conceivable way to introduce precedent in the DSB. In
principle, one could consider an institution where the DSB ￿completes￿the contract not just for the realized
state s0 but also for other states. Given our assumptions this is unlikely to be an attractive option, because
the DSB observes a signal of ￿(s) only for the realized state s0, while it has no information at all for any other
state. Moreover, describing states that are di⁄erent from the realized state s0 is likely to be costly, just as it
is costly to describe states ex-ante. But it is not hard to imagine a slightly di⁄erent model where it might
be attractive to extend the application of precedent beyond the realized state s0. Suppose for example that
￿(s) is increasing in each state variable si (so that each si is interpreted as a political shock that increases
the payo⁄from protection), and this is known to the DSB. Then it might be desirable to adopt the following
precedent system: if the DSB ruling is FT for state s0, in the future the same ruling applies for any state
s ￿ s0, and if the ruling is P for state s0, in the future the same ruling applies for any state s ￿ s0. (This
means that, for example, if the DSB chooses FT in a situation where there is an import surge and the
import-competing industry has shrunk, then in the future FT will apply also if there is an import surge but
the import-competing industry has not shrunk.) We suspect that the same qualitative results of our model
would extend to this richer setting.
40Thus, for example, if the realized state is (0;1;0;1;0;0;0) and the DSB rules FT for this state, the
DSB can describe this ruling in a way that establishes precedent as ￿if shocks s2 and s4 occur and there are
no other signi￿cant shocks, then FT applies,￿whereas describing all possible states ex ante may be very
di¢ cult or even impossible.
27Period-1 signal, so that if the same state occurs in both periods and if the DSB is invoked
in both periods (which is possible in the absence of legal precedent), then the DSB uses only
the Period-2 signal when making its Period-2 ruling.41 It is now immediately clear that, if
invoked in Period 2, the DSB behaves exactly as it did in the static model characterized in
the previous section, because at this point precedent for the future is irrelevant. We now
observe that the DSB behaves exactly as it did in the static model even if it is invoked in
Period 1: the reason is that the prospect that its ruling will set a precedent for the future
does not alter the conclusion that, to maximize the expected joint payo⁄of the governments
given its observed signal, the DSB will issue the ruling T DSB
1 (s) = P if and only if under the
state s it observes a signal ￿DSB
1 (s) > 0.42
3.3 Analysis
In the absence of legal precedent, it is straightforward to see that our dynamic model behaves
exactly as a (twice repeated) version of the static model, and our analysis from the previous
section carries over. Moreover, it is immediate that introducing precedent has no impact on
the performance of any of the institutions with a non-activist DSB, that is, on the institutions
(Dn;Rn;Vn). Also, Rm is again outcome-equivalent to Dg, and hence dominated. Therefore,
to evaluate the role of legal precedent in the optimal institution, we need only derive the
impact of precedent on the performance of the vague and the discretionary contracts when
the activist DSB mandates are, respectively, to interpret and to gap-￿ll, that is, on the
institutions Vi and Dg.
We now derive how the performance of the institutions Dg and Vi change when DSB
rulings set precedent. We let DP
g and V P
i denote the corresponding institutions. Let us
begin with DP
g .
We work backwards through time, starting from Period 2. Denote the Period-1 realized
state by s0. Observe ￿rst that, if there is no Period-1 ￿ling, then Period 2 behaves exactly
like the static model under the Dg institution for all s. If instead there is a Period-1
￿ling with associated Period-1 DSB ruling T DSB
1 (s0), then in Period 2 the contract speci￿es
T2(s0) = T DSB
1 (s0) and the DSB has no active role for s = s0, while for s 6= s0, Period 2
41We make this assumption to keep the model as simple as possible and to focus on the main interesting
results. But it is clear that allowing the DSB to recall its past signals would introduce another cost of
precedent, because under precedent the DSB cannot then reduce the noise of its signal with repeated draws
over time for the same state. Notice, though, that our assumptions stack the deck in favor of precedent, by
assuming no DSB recall and ignoring the DSB cost of describing the realized state s0, and yet we will show
below that precedent still performs less well than one might expect.
42As in the static model, this follows from the fact that the DSB signal is unbiased and its priors are
uninformative, and so there is no reason for the DSB to deviate from this behavior simply because its ruling
may create a precedent for the future.
28behaves exactly like the static model under the Dg institution.
Now consider Period 1. The exporter government ￿les a complaint if and only if T = P
and the expected bene￿t of ￿ling exceeds the cost of ￿ling. Denote by BE
P(s0) the expected
Period-2 value to the exporter of the precedent that would be set by a DSB ruling, conditional
on the realized Period-1 state s0 (but before the ￿ling decision is made and the Period-1
ruling is known). Then the exporter government ￿les a complaint in Period 1 when the
realized state is s0 if and only if T = P and








Condition (F1) is the Period-1 ￿￿ling￿condition to invoke the DSB in our dynamic model,
and it di⁄ers from the analogous condition (F) in the static model in that there is now a
second term ￿BE
P(s0) on the left-hand-side.
It can be shown that the term BE








p(s0) ￿ c￿ if s0 2 ^ ￿
P [ ^ ￿
FT
p(s0) ￿ [qk(s0)j￿￿(s0)j] if s0 2 ￿Pn^ ￿
P
￿p(s0) ￿ [qk(s0)j￿￿(s0)j] if s0 2 ￿FTn^ ￿
FT:
(10)
where the sets ^ ￿
FT and ^ ￿
P are as de￿ned in the previous section. This expression conforms
to a simple intuition. Observe ￿rst that precedent is only relevant in Period 2 if the Period-
2 state realization is also s0, which occurs with probability p(s0). This explains why each
term on the right-hand-side is multiplied by p(s0). For s0 2 ^ ￿
P [ ^ ￿
FT, the exporter would
have ￿led in Period 2 if not for the precedent created by the Period-1 DSB ruling, and
so the exporter saves the Period-2 ￿ling cost c￿. For s0 2 ￿Pn^ ￿
P, the exporter would not
have ￿led in Period 2 and the importer would have chosen T = P, so the exporter enjoys a
Period-2 bene￿t of j￿￿(s0)j from the precedent created by the Period-1 DSB ruling provided
the ruling is in error, which happens with probability qk(s0). Finally, for s0 2 ￿FTn^ ￿
FT, the
exporter would not have ￿led in Period 2 and the importer would have chosen T = FT, so
the exporter su⁄ers a Period-2 loss in the amount ￿￿(s0) from the precedent created by the
Period-1 DSB ruling if the ruling is in error, which happens with probability qk(s0).
Next consider the importer government￿ s Period-1 policy choice. Denote by BM
P (s0) the
expected Period-2 value to the importer, given the realized Period-1 state s0, of the legal
precedent that would be set by a DSB ruling. The importer government chooses T = P if
either (F1) fails or if (F1) holds and the expected bene￿t from trade protection exceeds the
29cost of a DSB dispute:





0) > c: (P1)
It can be shown that the term BM








p(s0) ￿ c if s0 2 ^ ￿
FT [ ^ ￿
P
p(s0) ￿ [qk(s0)￿(s0)] if s0 2 ￿FTn^ ￿
FT
￿p(s0) ￿ [qk(s0)￿(s0)] if s0 2 ￿Pn^ ￿
P:
(11)
This expression has an analogous interpretation to that described above for BE
P(s0).
Again to reduce the number of cases and focus on the more interesting ones, we impose for
the dynamic model a slight strengthening of the static-model condition (2). Speci￿cally, we
now assume that in the case of maximal DSB noise (qk = 1=2), the (F1) and (P1) conditions








(1 ￿ ￿p(s))￿(s) > c for all s: (12)
As in the previous section, condition (12) ensures that c￿ and c are su¢ ciently small so that,
for any level of DSB noise, (i) if the ￿rst best policy is P, the importer government chooses
P in Period 1 whether or not this triggers a complaint by the exporter government, and (ii)
if the ￿rst best policy is FT but the importer government still chooses P in Period 1, the
exporter government ￿les a complaint.
It is now a simple matter to derive the equilibrium Period-1 actions of the governments
for each state under the Dg institution when DSB rulings set precedent:
1. For s 2 ￿FT: if qk(s) < c
(1+￿p(s))￿(s) then T1 = FT and the DSB is not invoked in
Period 1; if instead qk(s) > c
(1+￿p(s))￿(s) then T1 = P and the DSB is invoked in Period 1.
2. For s 2 ￿P: if qk(s) < c￿
(1+￿p(s))j￿￿(s)j then T1 = P and the DSB is not invoked in
Period 1; if instead qk(s) > c￿
(1+￿p(s))j￿￿(s)j then T1 = P and the DSB is invoked in Period 1;.
It is instructive to compare the Period-1 equilibrium actions of the governments under
the DP
g institution and under the Dg institution. In e⁄ect, for s 2 ￿FT, precedent magni￿es
the gain that the importer can anticipate (from ￿(s) to (1+￿p(s))￿(s)) if it provokes a DSB
￿ling by setting T = P and the DSB rules in error (which the DSB does with probability
qk(s)). And similarly, for s 2 ￿P, precedent magni￿es the gain that the exporter can
anticipate (from j￿￿(s)j to (1 + ￿p(s))j￿￿(s)j) if it ￿les against T = P and the DSB rules in
error (which the DSB does with probability qk(s)).
The above argument leads us to an important observation: the equilibrium frequency of
30(Period-1) disputes rises with the introduction of legal precedent. But as we noted in the
previous section in the context of the static model, the equilibrium motives that trigger a
DSB ￿ling are always ine¢ cient from an ex-ante perspective, and it is the o⁄-equilibrium
impacts of the activist role of the DSB that are e¢ ciency-enhancing. By itself, therefore, the
observation that precedent increases the equilibrium ￿ling frequency suggests that introduc-
ing precedent into the Dg institution could diminish the e¢ ciency of the institution. Also
note that, even though introducing precedent makes the DSB in some sense ￿more activist,￿
this does not increase the bene￿cial o⁄-equilibrium e⁄ect of the DSB. However, weighing
against these negative e⁄ects of precedent is the bene￿t of eliminating the duplicative costs
of ￿ling each period.
To assess the net impact of the opposing e⁄ects, let L(DP
g ) denote the loss (relative to
the ￿rst best) associated with the DP
g institution. De￿ne ^ ￿
FT
P as the set of states s such
that s 2 ￿FT and qk(s) > c
(1+￿p(s))￿(s), and similarly de￿ne ^ ￿
P
P as the set of states s such
that s 2 ￿P and qk(s) > c￿
(1+￿p(s))j￿￿(s)j. In analogy with the set ^ ￿
FT de￿ned in the previous
section, ^ ￿
FT
P is the set of states for which (i) Free Trade is e¢ cient and (ii) in Period 1 there
is a dispute in equilibrium under the DP
g institution. And in analogy with the set ^ ￿
P de￿ned
in the previous section, ^ ￿
P
P is the set of states for which (i) Protection is e¢ cient and (ii) in
Period 1 there is a dispute in equilibrium under the DP
g institution.
With these sets de￿ned, we have:
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where ^ ￿ ￿ ^ ￿
P [ ^ ￿
FT is the set of states where ￿ling occurs in the absence of precedent and
^ ￿ ￿ (^ ￿
P
P [ ^ ￿
FT
P )n(^ ￿
P [ ^ ￿
FT) is the set of states for which ￿ling occurs in the presence of
precedent but not in its absence.
The ￿rst term on the right-hand-side of (13) represents the Period-1 e¢ ciency loss gen-
erated by precedent, coming from the additional equilibrium ￿ling behavior and associated
DSB error and ￿ling cost. The second term on the right-hand-side of (13) represents the
discounted Period-2 e¢ ciency loss generated by precedent: this can be understood by ob-
serving that p2(s) is the probability that state s will occur in both Period 1 and Period 2,
and therefore that the precedent set from a Period-1 ruling in state s will be relevant in
Period 2. Finally, the third term on the right-hand-side of (13) is the discounted Period-2
savings in duplicative ￿ling cost over the states in which Period-2 ￿ling would have occurred
in the absence of precedent (i.e., s 2 ^ ￿).
Evidently, L(DP
g ) < L(Dg) ￿ and hence the introduction of precedent enhances the
performance of the Dg institution ￿only if the savings in duplicative ￿ling costs outweighs
31the ine¢ ciencies associated with the additional ￿ling behavior.
We turn next to the vague contract and the interpretive role of the DSB. If the Period-1
realized state s0 is neither s0 nor s1, then all of the statements made above apply, with V P
i
and Vi taking the place respectively of DP
g and Dg. If instead s0 2 fs0;s1g, then there is
no activist role for the DSB in Period 1 under the Vi or the V P
i institution, the importer
government makes the ￿rst-best Period-1 policy choice (FT if s0 = s0, P if s0 = s1), and
Period 2 behaves exactly like the static model under Vi.
Hence, de￿ning ￿ ￿FT
P as the set of states s such that s 2 ￿FTns0 and qk(s) > c
(1+￿p(s))￿(s),
and ￿ ￿P
P as the set of states s such that s 2 ￿Pns1 and qk(s) > c￿
(1+￿p(s))j￿￿(s)j, we can write
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where in analogy with the de￿nitions of ^ ￿ and ^ ￿, we de￿ne ￿ ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿P
P [￿ ￿FT
P )n(￿ ￿P [￿ ￿FT) and
￿ ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿P [ ￿ ￿FT).
Clearly, introducing precedent into the Vi institution involves identical trade-o⁄s to those
described above for the Dg institution, except that the two extreme states s0 and s1 are
excluded from (included in) this tradeo⁄ for the Vi institution (Dg institution).
Thus far we have derived explicitly the e¢ ciency losses associated with the DP
g and V P
i
institutions. The next step of the analysis is to examine the optimal choice of institution.
In this setting, we need to consider six candidates for an optimum, namely the same four
institutions considered in the static model (Rn;Vn;Vi and Dg) plus the two institutions with
precedent (DP
g and V P
i ). In general, any of these six institutions can be optimal depending
on parameter values, but we can say something about how changes in q and ￿ a⁄ect the
optimal choice of institution.
Consider ￿rst the impact of changes in the DSB noise q. In analogy with the previous
section, an increase in q clearly favors non-activist-DSB institutions over activist-DSB insti-
tutions, so that as q increases the optimal institution can only switch from one of the latter
to one of the former. Also, it continues to be true that an increase in q favors institutions
where the DSB interprets a vague contract (Vi and V P
i ) over institutions where the DSB ￿lls
gaps (Dg and DP
g ), so that as q increases the optimal institution can only switch from one of
the latter to one of the former. Thus, the result of Proposition 1 generalizes to this dynamic
setting: as q increases, the optimal institution switches from a discretionary contract with
a gap-￿lling DSB to a vague contract with a contract-interpreting DSB to a vague or rigid
contract with a non-activist DSB (possibly ￿skipping over￿one or more of these).
But how does an increase in q a⁄ect the desirability of introducing precedent-setting
in the DSB? To answer this question we need to understand how q a⁄ects the di⁄erences
32L(DP
g ) ￿ L(Dg) and L(V P
i ) ￿ L(Vi). We focus our discussion on L(DP
g ) ￿ L(Dg); the same
conclusions will be true for L(V P
i ) ￿ L(Vi).
Let us assume that k(s) is su¢ ciently close (or equal) to 1=2 for all s, so that as q goes
from zero to one, the DSB signal goes from perfect to uninformative. This is a natural way
to parameterize the degree to which the DSB is informed, with q = 0 then indicating that
the DSB is perfectly informed and q = 1 indicating that the DSB is completely uninformed.
Consider equation (13). Note ￿rst that, if q = 0, the sets ^ ￿ and ^ ￿ are both empty, and
hence L(DP
g ) ￿ L(Dg) = 0. As q increases from zero, the ￿rst of these two sets to become
non-empty is ^ ￿, and hence L(DP
g ) ￿ L(Dg) > 0.43 Next note that, if q = 1, ￿ling occurs for
all states both in the presence and in the absence of precedent, and therefore ^ ￿ includes all
states and ^ ￿ is empty, and hence L(DP
g ) ￿ L(Dg) < 0. It is then a small step to prove the
following result:
Proposition 3 Conditional on the DSB playing an activist role (gap-￿lling or interpreta-
tion), it is optimal to give the DSB precedent-setting authority when the DSB is su¢ ciently
uninformed, while it is preferable not to do so when the DSB is su¢ ciently informed.
Proposition 3 reports a somewhat surprising result, but it can be understood to re￿ ect a
simple logic as follows. Consider the Dg and DP
g institutions (analogous arguments hold for
the Vi and V P
i institutions). In the case where the DSB is su¢ ciently uninformed, the DSB
will be invoked in every state realization under the Dg institution, and so when precedent-
setting power is introduced into the DSB the equilibrium Period-1 frequency of ￿lings cannot
rise (because it is already 1): the only e⁄ect of moving from Dg to DP
g in this case is then to
eliminate duplicative ￿ling costs in Period 2, which is e¢ ciency enhancing. For this reason,
endowing the DSB with precedent-setting powers in the Dg institution is desirable when the
DSB operates with su¢ ciently little information. Now consider the case where the DSB is
su¢ ciently informed so that the DSB will not be invoked in any state realization under the
Dg institution: introducing precedent and moving from Dg to DP
g in this case will either (i)
preserve the absence of DSB ￿lings in all state realizations, in which case Dg and DP
g are
outcome-equivalent, or (ii) lead to a Period-1 ￿ling in at least some state realization under
DP
g , in which case the equilibrium Period-1 frequency of ￿lings is increased while there is no
elimination of duplicative ￿ling costs in Period 2, and therefore e¢ ciency must be reduced.
43To see this, note that ^ ￿ is the set of states s such that either (i) s 2 ￿FT and c
q(1+￿p(s))￿(s) < k(s) < c
q￿(s),
or (ii) s 2 ￿P and c
￿
q(1+￿p(s))j￿￿(s)j < k(s) < c
￿
qj￿￿(s)j, while the set ^ ￿ is the set of states s such that either
(i) s 2 ￿FT and k(s) > c
q￿(s), or (ii) s 2 ￿P and k(s) > c
￿
qj￿￿(s)j. As q increases from zero, the thresholds
c
q(1+￿p(s))￿(s) and c
q￿(s) drop down from in￿nity. It is clear from inspection of the inequalities above that the
￿rst set to become nonempty is ^ ￿:
33For this reason, endowing the DSB with precedent-setting powers in the Dg institution is
undesirable when the DSB operates with su¢ ciently good information.
Next we consider the impact of changes in the discount factor ￿. Again we focus our
discussion on L(DP
g )￿L(Dg); the same conclusions will be true for L(V P
i )￿L(Vi). We now
argue that, for q in an intermediate range, endowing the DSB with precedent-setting powers
in the Dg institution is (strictly) desirable if governments are su¢ ciently impatient, while it
is preferable not to do so if governments are su¢ ciently patient.
Here the key observations are that (i) when ￿ = 0, the set ^ ￿ is empty; and (ii) the set
^ ￿ is independent of ￿, while the set ^ ￿ is weakly increasing in ￿ and as ￿ ! 1 the set ^ ￿
includes all states s that are not in ^ ￿. Consider the case where q lies in an intermediate
range, so that the set ^ ￿ is non-empty but not ￿too large￿(i.e., contains a small subset of all
states); when ￿ = 0, we have by (i) that ^ ￿ is empty, and so (13) implies L(DP
g ) = L(Dg);
for ￿ > 0 but su¢ ciently small, (13) implies L(DP
g ) < L(Dg); and for ￿ ! 1, we have by
(ii) that ^ ￿ includes all states s that are not in ^ ￿, and so (13) implies L(DP
g ) > L(Dg); hence
in this case introducing precedent is (strictly) desirable if and only if governments are not
too patient (i.e., if and only if ￿ is not too high). The argument for L(V P
i ) ￿ L(Vi) runs
analogously.
It follows from the previous discussion that increasing the degree of patience (￿) makes
precedent-setting less attractive when the quality of DSB information (q) lies in an interme-
diate range. The following proposition records this result:
Proposition 4 There exists an intermediate range of q such that, conditional on the DSB
playing an activist role (gap-￿lling or interpretation), it is optimal to give the DSB precedent-
setting authority if ￿ is su¢ ciently low, while it is preferable not to do so if ￿ is su¢ ciently
high.
The intuition for the ￿nding reported in Proposition 4 is simple. If q is either su¢ ciently
low or su¢ ciently high, we know from Proposition 3 that introducing precedent is respectively
undesirable or desirable regardless of the level of ￿. What Proposition 4 indicates is that,
when q lies in an intermediate range, the level of ￿ becomes decisive. In particular, when ￿
is small, introducing precedent adds little additional impetus to initiate a dispute with the
DSB, and the implied savings of duplicative ￿ling costs then dominate the e¢ ciency e⁄ects,
making precedent-setting attractive. On the other hand, a large ￿ magni￿es the additional
impetus to initiate a dispute with the DSB that comes from the introduction of precedent,
and this accentuates the e¢ ciency-reducing impacts of a precedent-setting DSB to a su¢ cient
degree that the introduction of precedent-setting powers becomes unattractive.
343.4 Persistent shocks
We conclude this section by considering a simple extension of the model with persistent
shocks. Suppose that the probability of state s occurring in Period 2 conditional on state s
having occurred in Period 1 is ~ p(s;￿), where ￿ is a persistence parameter, so that @~ p=@￿ > 0.
Also let ^ p(s;￿) be the probability that the realized state in both Period 1 and Period 2 is
s, with @^ p=@￿ > 0. Introducing persistence in the model changes the analysis only at two
junctures. First, in the expressions for BM
P (s0) and BE
P(s0) above, p(s0) is replaced by ~ p(s0;￿).
This implies that, in the (F1) and (P1) conditions, an increase in ￿ has the same qualitative
impact as an increase in ￿, which in turn implies that ￿ and ￿ have the same qualitative
impact on the sets ^ ￿ and ￿ ￿. Second, in the expressions for L(DP
g )￿L(Dg) and L(V P
i )￿L(Vi),
the term p2(s) is replaced by ^ p(s;￿), so ￿ and ￿ enter these expressions through ￿^ p(s;￿). It
is direct to conclude that an increase in ￿ has the same qualitative impact on these loss
di⁄erences as an increase in ￿.
This last observation has an interesting, and perhaps surprising, implication: a high
degree of persistence in political shocks ￿or more generally shocks to government preferences
￿tends to disfavor the use of precedent, even though it magni￿es the savings of duplicative
￿ling costs a⁄orded by precedent-setting. The intuition for this result is analogous to the
intuition for the impact of ￿: when persistence is high, precedent-setting magni￿es the
governments￿incentives to initiate disputes (which reduce e¢ ciency) more than it magni￿es
the savings in duplicative ￿ling costs.
4 Discussion
In this section we explore brie￿ y a number of dimensions from which we have thus far
abstracted in our theoretical analysis.
4.1 Further institutional design possibilities
We have considered a fairly simple set of institutional design possibilities. In particular, we
have assumed that the DSB, if invoked, maximizes the governments￿joint payo⁄based on its
own (imperfect) information. Moreover we have assumed that the DSB￿ s information is given
by a noisy signal that is used to update the DSB￿ s (uninformative) priors. Finally, the DSB
in our model is non-strategic, in the sense that it does not try to infer the governments￿true
preferences from the governments￿actions. One could consider at least three potential ways
to enhance the e¢ ciency of the institution. First, the DSB could try to extract information
from the governments through a revelation mechanism, for example some form of ￿hearing.￿
35This is what happens in actual WTO trade disputes, where governments have a chance to
present their arguments before the DSB makes a decision. Second, the DSB could be given a
mandate to maximize a di⁄erent objective than the governments￿joint payo⁄. In principle,
this could have bene￿cial e⁄ects through its impact on the governments￿￿ling behavior.44
And third, the DSB could be strategic and try to make inferences from the governments￿
choices.
We discuss ￿rst the possibility of a DSB hearing. There exists a small literature on
cheap-talk games where ￿experts￿send messages to a less informed decision maker. Two
prominent examples of this literature are Krishna and Morgan (2001) and Battaglini (2002).
In Battaglini￿ s model, two experts simultaneously send cheap-talk messages, and then the
policy-maker makes a decision; Krishna and Morgan consider a similar game, except that
the experts send messages in a sequential fashion. The results of these papers suggest
that, in a setting where the experts have con￿ icting interests, as in our model, the decision
maker (DSB) may be able to elicit some information from the experts (governments) but
is unlikely to learn the state with certainty.45 This suggests a reinterpretation of the signal
￿DSB observed by the DSB in our model: ￿DSB can be thought of as incorporating the
information that the DSP is able to extract from the hearings, and q can be interpreted as
capturing the DSB￿ s residual uncertainty about ￿ after the hearings. Conditional on this
reinterpretation, our qualitative insights are likely to still be valid even in this setting.46
Let us focus next on the possibility of biasing the DSB￿ s objective away from the gov-
ernments￿joint payo⁄. Consider for example biasing the DSB￿ s objective slightly in favor
of free trade: this can be captured by assuming that the DSB rules in favor of the exporter
if and only if ￿DSB(s) > ￿￿, where ￿ is some small positive number. Recall that in our
44The idea that biasing a court￿ s objective may have a bene￿cial e⁄ect through the equilibrium frequency
of litigation is present also in Bustos (2007b), though in a very di⁄erent setting.
45We can be a little more precise here. The above mentioned papers analyze situations where the private
information and the policy vector have the same dimensionality. Negative results (non-existence of fully
revealing equilibria in the hearing game) are obtained in the one-dimensional case with strong con￿ ict of
interests (Krishna-Morgan, 2001, Propositions 1 and 4; Battaglini, 2002, Proposition 2). In our model,
both the policy choice (T) and the private-information parameter (￿) are one-dimensional, and the con￿ ict
of interests is strong, because in each state of the world the two governments prefer the opposite policy.
Although our model does not perfectly ￿t the frameworks of Battaglini or Krishna and Morgan, their results
suggest that full revelation would not occur in our case.
46In this discussion we have implicitly assumed that the DSB cannot impose monetary penalties (or more
generally, transfers) conditional on the governments￿reports. If such penalties were available, there would
exist mechanisms that implement the ￿rst best. For example, suppose that governments simultaneously
announce the value of ￿ and, if the reports are di⁄erent, both governments are hit with steep penalties.
Clearly this kind of mechanism can implement the ￿rst best, because it is an equilibrium for the governments
to reveal the true value of ￿. But we believe it is reasonable to abstract from this kind of mechanism; in
reality the DSB does not have the power to impose penalties on governments for the policies they choose, let
alone for the announcements they make. See subsection 4.4 below for a discussion of self-enforcement issues.
36basic model the DSB rules in favor of the exporter if and only if ￿DSB(s) > 0; thus ￿ > 0
introduces a pro-trade bias in the DSB decision.47 It is immediate to verify that introduc-
ing a pro-trade bias of this kind has four e⁄ects: (i) it decreases the accuracy of the DSB
rulings for states such that s 2 ￿P and the DSB is invoked in equilibrium; (ii) it increases
the accuracy of the DSB rulings for states such that s 2 ￿FT and the DSB is invoked in
equilibrium; (iii) it increases the frequency of equilibrium disputes for states s 2 ￿P, which
weighs negatively on the performance of the institution; and (iv) it decreases the frequency
of equilibrium disputes for states s 2 ￿FT, which is bene￿cial for the performance of the
institution. The net e⁄ect can go either way, depending on the details of the underlying
structure, including how many states are in the sets ￿P and ￿FT, and how many states
in each set are close to the margin where a dispute is triggered in equilibrium. A similar
argument can be made for the e⁄ects of an anti-trade bias in the DSB objective.
Based on this discussion, we suggest that biasing the DSB￿ s objective might in principle
enhance the performance of the institution, but even if this is the case, the optimal direction
of the bias (pro-trade or anti-trade) is far from obvious, and it requires a great deal of
information about the fundamental structure of the problem, which governments are unlikely
to possess in reality.
Finally we discuss brie￿ y the possibility that the DSB might try to extract information
from the observation of the governments￿choices. A full analysis of this question would
require solving a complicated three-player signalling model, in which the governments are
the (sequential) ￿senders￿and the DSB is the ￿receiver.￿While this goes beyond the scope
of the present paper, our intuition suggests that the DSB would be unlikely to extract much
information from the governments￿actions. The intuition is that in our basic model, where
the DSB is not strategic, the governments￿equilibrium actions contain little information
about the sign of ￿: recall that in general the exporter ￿les complaints both when s 2 ￿FT
and when s 2 ￿P, and thus the fact that a complaint has been ￿led says little about the sign
of ￿; and when a complaint is ￿led, the policy chosen by the importer is always T = P, so
the importer￿ s choice conditional on a complaint being ￿led conveys no information at all on
the sign of ￿.48
47As we noted in section 2.6, some commentators have expressed the view that the WTO DSB is biased
in favor of free trade. In that section, we explored the possibility that such a bias might re￿ ect a selection
bias in the equilibrium ￿ling of DSB cases rather than a bias in DSB rulings conditional on a case being
￿led. Here we focus on the latter possibility, and consider whether introducing a bias into the DSB￿ s decision
might be warranted from an institutional design persepective (perhpas to o⁄set the e⁄ects of the selection
bias identi￿ed in section 2.6).
48In principle there is a third action that could convey some information: the governments￿ex-ante choice
of contract. Intuitively, however, this choice can convey little information about the value of ￿ for the speci￿c
state of the world ex post when the dispute arises.
374.2 Multidimensional policies
Many WTO disputes in practice concern the presence of gaps and vague provisions in the
agreement regarding which policies are allowed and which are not. For example, there
have been a number of disputes concerning whether certain policies should or should not
be categorized as prohibited subsidy programs under the GATT/WTO agreement.49 Our
framework can be extended to examine the potential role of the DSB in completing an
incomplete agreement on the policy dimension. In this section we discuss brie￿ y what such
an extension might look like.
One natural way to explain why the agreement might be incomplete in specifying the
allowed policies is to suppose that the policy space is complex, unlike our basic model where
the policy is one-dimensional (and zero-one) in nature. In this spirit, one could assume
that the Home country chooses a multidimensional policy, say t = (t1;:::;tM), with each
ti representing a binary policy instrument. For example, the vector t could be a subsidy
program, and each ti a component of the subsidy program (e.g., ti = 1 might mean ￿foreign
earnings are exempted from income taxation,￿whereas ti = 0 means ￿no foreign-earning
exemption￿ ).
Suppose that, to achieve the ￿rst best outcome, a certain subset of instruments needs
to be constrained. For the sake of simplicity, suppose the state is deterministic, so that we
can abstract from issues of state-contingency. In analogy with our basic model, suppose
that it is too costly to describe policy instruments in detail, thus leaving only a few contract
possibilities: the contract could leave complete discretion on subsidies, or it could impose
a ￿rigid￿ban on subsidies (i.e. specify ti = 0 for all i); or, as a third possibility, it could
specify some ￿vague￿ rule on subsidies, as for example in the sentence ￿trade-distorting
subsidy programs are not allowed.￿In analogy with our modeling of vague language in the
basic model, let us also suppose that the sentence ￿the subsidy program is trade-distorting￿
is true for t = (1;:::;1), false for t = (0;:::;0) and unde￿ned for all other values of t. Each
of these incomplete contracts (discretionary, rigid, vague) could be associated with a non-
activist DSB, or with an activist DSB that has a mandate to complete the contract in the
relevant dimension. Finally, it would be natural to assume that, if the DSB has an activist
mandate, the Foreign country can choose to dispute one or more of the policy instruments
chosen by Home, with the litigation cost increasing in the number of disputed instruments.
It is easy to imagine how a model of the kind we just sketched could give rise to an
49A prominent example was the U.S ￿FSC case (WTO, 1999), in which provisions of the U.S. tax code
which exempted U.S. multinationals from paying taxes on income earned outside the United States were
ruled as prohibited export subsidies and therefore in violation of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures.
38institutional choice whereby the contract speci￿es a vague rule on subsidies and the DSB is
given a mandate to interpret this rule should a dispute arise, which seems broadly consistent
with what we observe in the WTO DSB. Also, given that the notions of vagueness, rigidity
and discretion (with the corresponding potential roles of the DSB ￿interpretation, gap-￿lling
and modi￿cation) extend in a fairly natural way to a setting of multidimensional policies,
we suspect that a number of the qualitative results derived in our basic model would arise
in this setting as well.
One result that might change in a setting with multidimensional policies is that discretion
without gap-￿lling (Dn) is dominated. If there is heterogeneity across the policy instruments,
so that discretion is more desirable for some instruments than for others, and if the role of
the DSB must be the same across instruments, then in principle it might be optimal to have
some gaps in the contract (discretion on some instruments) but give the DSB only a mandate
to interpret vague provisions, not ￿ll gaps.50
We conclude this discussion by noting that, in a setting with multidimensional policies,
legal precedent would have a di⁄erent role than in our basic model. If the DSB￿ s role is
only to interpret the contract or ￿ll a gap for a speci￿c state, as in our basic model, then
legal precedent would be applicable only if the same exact state occurs again in the future.
But if the DSB￿ s role is also to clarify obligations regarding a given policy instrument, and
these obligations apply across states of the world, then legal precedent would apply much
more broadly than in our basic model. Interestingly, though, recall from section 3 that when
precedent applies with higher probability in the future (for example because of a higher ￿),
precedent tends to be less desirable; hence in a multidimensional policy setting such as the
one described above, precedent may end up looking less appealing than in our basic model.
4.3 Consultations and early settlement of disputes
Here we focus on a prominent feature of the WTO dispute settlement process that does not
appear in our basic model. The WTO￿ s dispute settlement process emphasizes consultations
between the disputing parties prior to the ￿ling of a formal complaint with the DSB, and
indeed Busch and Reinhardt (2006) report that roughly half of WTO disputes are resolved
in the consultation stage and roughly two-thirds are resolved at some point prior to a DSB
ruling. This raises the question of what distinguishes disputes that are resolved early from
50A related, interesting issue is whether the mandate of the DSB can ￿and if so, whether it should ￿be
made contingent on the policy instruments. This will depend on the cost of specifying policy instruments in
the agreement, and on the possible presence of non-separabilities between policy instruments. But it may
well be desirable to give di⁄erent mandates to the DSB according to broad issue areas. So, for example, the
DSB might be given a mandate to interpret rules on subsidies, but keep a non-activist role for labor and
environmental standards.
39disputes that proceed to a formal complaint and DSB ruling, and whether our model could
account for this distinction.
Our model suggests ￿or at least seems broadly compatible with ￿a few possible reasons
for the fact that some disputes are settled early.
First, from a pure enforcement perspective, the consultation stage may facilitate the
exchange of information between the two governments concerning the presence or absence
of a suspected deviation. Indeed, Article 4.3 of the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures Agreement states explicitly that the purpose of consultations is to ￿clarify the
facts of the situation and to arrive at a mutually agreed solution,￿and WTO rulings have
con￿rmed that this is a central purpose of consultations in WTO disputes generally (see,
for example, WTO, 2005). If consultations can be used to put to rest suspicion that an
unambiguous obligation has been violated, then some cases that are ￿led in light of such
suspicions could be settled early. As noted, we have abstracted from pure enforcement issues
in our formal model, but such issues could be introduced to accommodate early settlement
along the lines just described without altering our basic ￿ndings.
Second, even when (as in our formal model) pure enforcement of an unambiguous oblig-
ation is not at issue, the consultation stage may lead the two governments to exchange
information and learn more about the likely direction of a DSB ruling, which (as our model
indicates) may remove the governments￿incentives to trigger DSB intervention.51
A third possibility is that, in some cases, the governments may agree on some form of
compensation at the consultation stage. In models of pre-trial negotiation it is a standard
argument that, if side payments are available and the parties have symmetric information
(which is the case in our model), they will settle before going to court. In our basic model we
assumed away the possibility of transfers at the dispute stage; indeed, as we remarked earlier
(see footnote 8), monetary transfers are almost never used in the course of trade disputes,
and e⁄ecting compensation through changes in other policies is likely to be costly.52 But it
is conceivable that, in at least some of the cases, some form of compensation can be enacted
51A related argument can explain why roughly one sixth of all disputes are settled after the consultation
stage but before the ￿nal panel report. In reality the timing of events is as follows: if the consultation stage
does not produce a settlement, a DSB panel is formed, there are two rounds of testimony, and then the
panel issues an ￿interim￿ruling, at which point the disputants have a further chance to settle; if they do
not, there is a ￿nal round of testimony and then the DSB issues the ￿nal ruling. It is after the interim ruling
that the remaining one sixth of early-settlement cases occur. With this timing in mind, our model suggests
that a fraction of cases may get settled after the interim ruling but before the ￿nal ruling. Suppose that it is
costly both to ￿le the initial complaint and to go through the ￿nal round of the dispute. Then, if the interim
ruling removes some of the uncertainty about the direction of the ￿nal ruling, the governments￿incentives
to trigger the ￿nal ruling may be removed too.
52Moreover, the WTO explicitly discourages compensation as a means of settling disputes, encouraging
instead the parties to simply adjust the disputed policies.
40without too much cost, and this may help explain why some of the disputes are settled at
the consultation stage.
A fourth possibility would be suggested if one introduced a constraint on the governments￿
ability to monitor and litigate policies.53 To illustrate, let us suppose that there are many
policy instruments (over many industries), and the exporting country has the capacity to
scrutinize ￿and possibly ￿le a complaint ￿for at most M policies in a given time period.
Knowing this, the importing country may ￿nd it advantageous to act opportunistically on
a large number of policies (higher than M). Once the exporter chooses the M policies to
complain about and requests consultations, the importer might at that point withdraw the
policies that have a small chance of being upheld by the DSB (for example those that are in
fairly clear violation of the agreement), and stand ￿rm to a ￿nal DSB ruling on the policies
that have a higher chance of being upheld (for example those for which the agreement is
vague and the DSB is more likely to interpret in favor of the importer). This kind of
story seems broadly consistent with the evidence that governments often maintain a stock
of ￿documented￿suspected WTO violations of their trading partners, and from this stock
initiate a limited number of WTO cases each year (see, for example, Davis and Shirato,
2007).
We conclude by mentioning that, according to Busch and Reinhardt (2006), an important
determinant of settlement is whether or not third-parties become involved in the dispute
(possibly as a way to prevent discriminatory settlements), suggesting that a more complete
understanding of this issue would require an extension of our model to a multi-country
setting.54 Such an extension, however, takes us well beyond the scope of a single paper,
therefore we leave it for future work.
4.4 Self-enforcement
We have assumed that the DSB is able to enforce the obligations stipulated in the agreement,
as well as its own rulings in case of a dispute. In reality, the DSB does not have direct
enforcement power. Both the contractually stipulated obligations and the DSB rulings must
be self-enforcing, if they are to be relevant. This raises a natural question: Can there still
be a contract-completing role for the DSB ￿as proposed in this paper ￿in a world of self-
enforcing agreements? And can the results of the model be re-interpreted in a meaningful
way within such a world?
53We thank Christina Davis for suggesting this possibility to us.
54For example, if the absence of third-party involvement permits the disputing parties to reach a discrimi-
natory settlement that takes surplus from the unrepresented third parties, the interests of the two disputing
governments would not be directly in con￿ ict ex post, and a negotiated (discriminatory) settlement between
them would then be possible.
41The standard way to think about self-enforcing agreements is to consider a repeated
game played by two or more governments. Consider a world with N countries, and suppose
for the sake of simplicity that the one-shot game is separable in the N(N ￿ 1)=2 bilateral
relationships.55 Let us focus on a given bilateral relationship, say the one between countries
A and B. If countries A and B were su¢ ciently patient (assuming they have symmetric
information), they would be able to enforce the ￿rst best policies simply by the threat of
bilateral retaliation, without the need of a formal (complete or incomplete) contract of any
kind.
But now suppose that A and B are relatively impatient, so that they are not able to
enforce the ￿rst best policies. Then they may bene￿t from the involvement of third countries
in the enforcement process: to the extent that third countries can credibly threaten to in￿ ict
some punishment in case of violation, countries A and B may be able to sustain more
e¢ cient policies. Is there a potential contract-completing role for the DSB in this setting?
Not necessarily. If all N countries have symmetric information, then again there is no clear
role for a formal contract, let alone a DSB that ￿lls gaps or interprets this contract.
Finally, suppose that, while countries A and B know the relevant payo⁄ functions for
their bilateral relationship (let us call it ￿AB(s)), third countries do not. In this case, a role
for a formal (written) contract and for a contract-completing institution can arise. A formal
contract that stipulates obligations between A and B is a way to inform third parties of
what A and B would like to enforce ￿which third countries are not otherwise able to infer
because they do not know A and B￿ s true preferences. And if it is too costly to write a
complete formal contract, then a role for a DSB that helps complete the incomplete contract
may arise: in this setting, the DSB￿ s role would be to transmit its own (imperfect) guess of
the ￿AB-maximizing policy to third countries, so that third countries can lend enforcement
power to countries A and B.
Hence, we believe that the main ideas of our paper are relevant even from the perspective
of self-enforcing agreements, provided that they are re-interpreted in the broader context of
a multi-country setting in which the DSB serves to muster enforcement power from third
countries by transmitting information to them.
5 Conclusion
We conclude by discussing two issues. The ￿rst concerns an often-heard argument for why
trade agreements contain vague provisions and contractual gaps. It is often argued that,
when governments are at the bargaining table and encounter a ￿sensitive￿issue, such as
55See Maggi (1999) for an example of such a game.
42whether to allow for trade protection in contingencies where a government may be subject
to domestic political pressures, they may ￿nd it hard to agree on ￿rm policy obligations,
and choose instead to leave the agreement vague ￿or even to leave a gap ￿on that point.
In other words, leaving vagueness or discretion in the contract may be a way to ￿agree to
disagree,￿rather than an optimal response to contracting imperfections (such as costs of
describing or verifying contingencies). The question is: are the points we made in this paper
still valid if (part or all of) the contractual incompleteness in trade agreements is due to
political sensitivities of the sort just described?
We believe our framework is able ￿in spite of its simplicity ￿to capture this ￿political-
sensitivities￿explanation for the incompleteness of trade agreements. Indeed, we can in-
terpret the states s 2 ￿P as states where the political cost of imposing free trade in the
importing country exceeds the bene￿t for the exporting country, making it politically e¢ -
cient to leave discretion to the importing country in those states.56 The next observation
is that, while it is easy to rationalize the presence of discretion in the agreement based on
the political-sensitivities theory, it is less easy to rationalize the vagueness of an agreement
based solely on that argument: suppose there are no contracting costs; then the optimal
contract will be one that speci￿es unambiguously the states in which free trade must be
applied (s 2 ￿FT), and leaves discretion in all other states (s 2 ￿P). Moreover, the political-
sensitivities theory ￿at least in its simple form considered above ￿cannot explain an activist
role for the DSB: if it is politically e¢ cient to leave discretion in certain states of the world,
then it is not clear why the governments would give a mandate for the DSB to remove that
discretion ex-post.57
The second issue we would like to address is whether our model of trade agreements can
be interpreted to apply more broadly to other legal settings. Do the same insights extend
to the optimal design of the role of courts more generally?
While a similar model structure could perhaps be applied to other types of international
agreements, we do not believe that the insights of the paper can be applied in a straightfor-
ward manner to the optimal design of domestic legal institutions, for at least three reasons.
First, our assumption that ex-post transfers are not available is not realistic in a domestic
56Here there is a small semantic point to clarify. Sometimes a contract is de￿ned ￿incomplete￿only if it fails
to achieve the ￿rst best outcome. Here we are adopting a broader de￿nition of contractual incompleteness,
which includes also the case in which discretion does not cause any divergence from the (political) ￿rst best.
57A slightly di⁄erent version of the politically-sensitivities theory is that, in some contingencies, free trade
may be the ￿rst-best policy but is not self-enforcing, because under those contingenices the importing govern-
ment has a strong incentive to defect. Then, the agreement may leave discretion under those contingencies in
order to preserve self-enforceability. The argument made in the text can be applied also to this version of the
politically-sensitivities theory, by re-interpreting the notion of (political) e¢ ciency as (political) e¢ ciency
subject to the self-enforcement constraint: again, if it is constrained-e¢ cient to leave discretion in certain
states of the world, it is not easy to rationalize a vague contract, or even less an activist role for the DSB.
43setting; the use of monetary compensation as both a settlement tool and a legal remedy is
pervasive in domestic settings. Second, at a more methodological level, we have adopted an
institutional design approach whereby the structure of the contract and the role of the court
are jointly designed ex-ante by the contracting parties (the governments). In a domestic
setting, the design of the judicial system and the design of private contracts are decoupled:
when two (or more) parties design a contract, they do so taking the court system and its
procedures as given; and the court system is designed by legislators (or constitution writ-
ers), presumably taking into account that there is a large and heterogenous population of
potential users of the court system.
Finally, trade agreements involve a relatively small number of players (the governments),
each of whom can expect to utilize the court system relatively frequently, while in most
domestic settings there is a large population of ￿small￿players (the individuals), each of
whom can expect to utilize the court system only rarely. This di⁄erence can itself produce
very di⁄erent implications. Consider for example the role of legal precedent. A key insight
that emerges from our model is that legal precedent has the harmful e⁄ect of increasing the
equilibrium frequency of disputes, whereas its main bene￿t lies in eliminating the duplicative
costs of disputes. But the increase in the equilibrium frequency of disputes is a consequence
of the fact that, when for example the Foreign government contemplates ￿ling, it takes into
account that with a certain probability it will ￿nd itself in the same situation again in the
future. In a domestic legal setting where an individual contemplates using the court system
only rarely, this consideration is unlikely to weigh signi￿cantly in the ￿ling decision. This
suggests that the main shortcoming of legal precedent that is highlighted by our model
would be much less important in a domestic setting, and hence legal precedent would be
more likely to be desirable in a domestic setting than in an international setting. More
broadly, the ￿small numbers￿feature of the trade-agreements setting is likely to distinguish
it in a variety of important ways from the typical domestic legal setting.58
For these reasons, we believe that the simple framework adopted in our paper would have
to be substantially modi￿ed before it can be fruitfully applied to the analysis of domestic
legal systems.
58There do exist some domestic settings in which a few ￿large￿ players establish a private arbitration
system within their contractual arrangement, for example in the area of labor relations or business-to-
business transactions. Our framework is potentially applicable to these settings (we thank Eric French for
suggesting this possibility to us).
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